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COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF ACCESS IN EMINENT DOMAIN IN
NEW YORK: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE NO-COMPENSATION
RULE WITH A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
RICHARD S. MAYBERRY* AND FRANK A. ALoi**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE location of a parcel of land with respect to adjoining streets or highways
is without question a factor of great importance in appraising the property
and arriving at its market value. Hypothesizing the appropriation of a parcel of
land abutting on a highway, the measure of damages would, in the first instance,
depend upon an analysis of the appropriation in light of the applicable constitu-
tional eminent domain provision. Article 1, section 7 of the New York Constitu-
tion states in relevant part that "Private Property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation . . . " The fifth amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution contains a similar provision. If it can be said that an abutter's right of
access is "private property" within the meaning of the New York constitutional
provision, an assumption which we shall later see does not necessarily hold true,
there should be no question that the state must compensate the abutting owner for
the loss of this right. Of course, if the test of compensability turned upon what
the condemnor got, it would be difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the
state actually received the abutter's access rights since in most instances what was
the abutter's right of access disappears into, e.g., a highway widening, the erec-
tion of guardrails, the construction of new highways. This, however, does not ap-
pear to be the prevailing rule of valuation. Just compensation must be paid for
what the owner has lost, not what the condemnor has gained, and this rule has
been uniformly accepted, at least in theory, by the courts of New York.'
Another method of analyzing what property rights should be compensable
in eminent domain focuses upon the factors that would be considered by a willing
buyer and seller operating in an open real estate market in their evaluation of the
subject property. There is no question that the general location of property with
respect to adjoining streets and highways would be considered an important ele-
ment by an arm's-length buyer or seller in arriving at a value for the property.
2
Thus, on the basis of either the pragmatic real estate market analysis summarized
above or a simplified constitutional analysis, an abutting owner would seem to
* B.A., LL.B.; Chief Law Assistant, New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, Fourth Department; Member, New York Bar.
** BA., M.P.A., LL.B.; associate, Robinson, Williams, Brown, Robinson & Angeloff,
Rochester, New York; Member, New York Bar.
1. The measure of damages is fair market value at the time of the taking. Roberts v.
New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935). Special value to the owner may not be considered. Matter
of Simmons (Ashokan Reservoir, Sec. No. 7), 130 App. Div. 356, 114 N.Y. Supp. 571 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 195 N.Y. 573, 88 N.E. 1132 (1909), aff'd sub nom., McGovern v. City
of New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913); see also Jahr, Eminent Domain § 70 (1953).
2. See Schmutz, Condemnation Appraisal Handbook chs. 11, 12 (1963); McMichael,
Appraising Manual 573-75, 580 (4th ed. ,1951).
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be entitled to just compensation when he is deprived of his rights of access by an
appropriation or condemnation. In this last statement, however, is rooted the
basis of the problem. The fact is that the simple constitutional schema for com-
pensation assumes away all of the problems. The abutter is entitled to com-
pensation only if he, in the first instance, can be said to have a right of access
which has reached the level of a property right, and, assuming that he has this
right, only if that right is in fact appropriated. Thus, loss of access under present
constitutional provisions in New York has not been and cannot be considered
in and of itself an act requiring the payment of just compensation by the state,
absent an affirmative determination of the two questions posed above.
The courts have tended to consider loss of access as an incident to any num-
ber of factually differing situations involving appropriations or condemnations of
land abutting highways. The so-called Elevated Railway cases3 were concerned
with damages accruing from loss of access, but only within the confines of the
somewhat narrow and unique fact patterns involved in those cases. It should be
noted that the schema of analysis used by the courts in several of the early
Elevated Railway cases was as close as any New York court has come to the
basic constitutional analysis stated above. These courts initially approached the
problem of compensation for loss of access by categorizing the interest which the
abutting owner had in the adjoining highway in terms of the right to access.
Courts often came to the apparent conclusion that the right to access was an
unqualified property right,4 and some commentators continue to cite the New
York cases in a misleading fashion to indicate the existence of an unqualified
property rightY Several of the later Elevated Railway cases G reached the con-
clusion that it had not been the intention of the courts in the earlier cases to
lay down any hard and fast rules governing compensation for loss of access re-
gardless of the reason for the appropriation, but rather those courts had in-
tended only to promulgate rules for compensation limited by the facts of the
particular case involved, i.e., the erection of elevated railways and the pattern of
ownership of the streets. Still other courts approached the problem of compensa-
tion for loss of access from a somewhat different point of view. The classification
of the particular interest or right taken was apparently deemed unimportant or
3. See infra at 633-37. The cases which fall within this class are numerous, and it
would serve no useful purpose to collect them here. See South Buffalo Ry. v. Kirkover, 176
N.Y. 301, 305, 68 N.E. 366, 368 (1903); see also cases collected in 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain
265 n.59 (1909).
4. See, e.g., Newman v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry., 118 N.Y. 618, 625, 23 N.E. 901, 902
(1890).
5. See, e.g., 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 5.72(1) (3d ed. 1950).
6. See, e.g., Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), afJ'd, 206
U.S. 536 (1907); Muhlker v. New York & H.R.R., 173 N.Y. 549, 556, 66 N.E. 558, 560(1903), rev'd, 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
7. See, e.g., Northern Lights Shopping Center, Inc. v. State, 20 A.D.2d 415, 420, 247
N.Y.S.2d 333, 338 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d
134, amended, 15 N.Y.2d 960, 207 N.E.2d 521, 259 N.Y.S.2d 849, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826
(1965).
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was overlooked and emphasis was placed upon the method 7 and reason 8 for the
taking. Again, the generality of this statement tends to complicate the problem in
that an analysis of the means by or through which governmental power is exer-
cised must, in addition, distinguish between the utilization of these means to
"take" private property or to "regulate" that property and hybrid combinations
of the two.
The police power, by definition, is not utilized to "take" property in the
physical sense but rather is used only to "regulate." 9 Similarly, it is only
through the exercise of the eminent domain power that a governing body can
physically "take" property.'0 Where regulation or a combination of regulation
and a taking were involved, the cases evolved an analysis whereby the interest of
the general public in safe and convenient highway travel was weighed against the
abutting property owner's right of access." The fact that the police power was
exercised as an adjunct to the eminent domain power was apparently considered
of little or no importance in terms of providing a basis for compensating the
abutting owner for a loss of access resulting primarily from regulation. More
often than not, the abutting owner's loss of access was held to be a non-compens-
able element of damage incidental to the promotion of the public welfare through
the supposedly lawful exercise of the police power. True, in the hybrid case
involving both "regulation" and a "taking," the abutter was awarded compensa-
tion for the actual physical taking but this was and is small solace where the non-
compensable regulation results in the destruction of a substantial part of the
economic value of the property.
The fact patterns in the loss of access cases can be categorized in terms of
pure regulation or a combination of regulation and a taking resulting in circuity
of access, or a change of grade and resultant circuity or loss of access, or the
complete destruction of the abutter's access to adjoining highways, or the altera-
tion of the volume of traffic around the abutter's property,' 2 or an interruption
or re-routing of traffic in the highways abutting the subject property. With but
two exceptions, the courts in each of the foregoing categories of cases protected
what were deemed to be the paramount rights of the general public at the expense
of the abutting owner. The change of grade cases were generally decided favorably
8. See, e.g., Mublker v. N.Y. & H.R.R., 173 N.Y. 549, 556, 66 N.E. 558, 560
(1903), rev'd, 197 U.S. 544 (1905) (public or private use).
9. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1955). See also Utah v. Dickenson, 275 App. Div.
120, 122, 88 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't), aff'd sub nom., Utah v. Baxter, 300 N.Y. 610, 90 N.E.2d
66 (1949) ; Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Police Power-A Common Misconception, 1959
Institute On Eminent Domain 1. The basic distinction between the two was also made in
Abbot, The Police Power and the Right to Compensation, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 189 (1889).
10. 29A C.I.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1955).
11. See, e.g., Northern Lights Shopping Center, Inc. v. State, 20 A.D.2d 415; 419, 247
N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 134,
amended, 15 N.Y.2d 960, 207 N.E.2d 521, 259 N.Y.S.2d 849, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965).
12. It has been suggested that flow of traffic is more valuable to roadside property than
direct access. Gorman, Access Loss Distinguished From Traffic Flow Diversion, 3 Ariz. L.
Rev. 48 (1961).
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for the abutting owner13 as were the total loss of access cases.14 None of these
cases utilized the basic constitutional analysis stated above, as indeed they could
not in light of the "regulation-taking" distinction applied by the courts. Rather,
the basis for compensation was generally found in statutes or ordinances specifi-
cally passed to facilitate compensation on the particular facts involved. 15
This cursory summary demonstrates that the courts have, until recently,
failed to isolate and emphasize the factor of loss of access as the touchstone
for each decision and have been largely concerned with a piecemeal consideration
of the different fact situations involved. The economic burden placed upon the
abutting owner as a result of the courts' failure to compensate for damage incident
to "regulation" and the adherence of the courts to a physical concept of "taking,"
has not often appeared to trouble the judiciary, at least in the reported opinions.
Though results have differed depending upon the particular facts involved,
the only unifying factor has unquestionably been the utilization of the police
power as the rule of decision.
Simply stated, the purpose of this article is to bring some order to the diverse
rules which have been developed in the many cases involving loss of access. The
approach, though involving to a certain extent an empirical analysis and classifi-
cation of the decisions, will be primarily concerned with the jurisprudential
mechanics of change. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the interaction of
the police power and eminent domain guarantee of compensation in the loss of
access cases and the resultant economic burden which has been imposed upon
the abutting owner by the balance struck between the two by the courts. The
possibility that a recovery should vary with the particular type of "loss of access"
involved, rather than depending solely upon the notion of "regulation" as op-
posed to "taking" will be explored. The modus operandi for effecting certain
changes in the law with respect to compensation for loss of access resulting from
an appropriation will be analyzed. The initial consideration will involve a
determination of how and to what extent it will be possible to overcome the
doctrine of stare decisis as it has evolved in the loss of access cases. The use of
statutes to provide recoveries where the courts have apparently elected to deny
compensation will also be considered. Necessarily involved in this analysis will be
a determination of whether statutory revision dictating a result which in some
instances will be contrary to the existing weight of judicial authority is likely
to effect the changes contemplated by the draftsmen. Finally, a close analysis of
the possibility of constitutional amendment as the basis for accomplishing certain
changes in the law will be conducted.
13. See, e.g., 240 Scott, Inc. v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 299, 221 N.E.2d 456, 274 N.Y.S.2d
673 (1966).
14. See, e.g., O'Brien v. New York C. & H.R.R., 148 App. Div. 733, 738 (2d Dep't
1912). These cases are best viewed as concessions to equity, since they do not differ except
in degree from cases where some access remains.
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Highway Law §§ 197 (change of grade), 12 (street closing and
consequent effect upon access). See also Note, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 242 (1939) ; Note, 12 Al-
bany L.J. S3 (1875).
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I. THE NEw YdRu CASES
Any analysis of the current state of the law in New York with regard to
compensation for loss of access has its beginnings for practical purposes in the
complex and extended litigation known as Sauer v. City of New York.'16 The
series of cases referred to above as the Elevated Railway cases had already been
decided-their holdings would be largely construed to be the product of unique
fact patterns and, as such, of little or no value in disposing of later loss of access
cases not similar on their facts.
The state court decision in the Sauer case was handed down in 1904 and
involved the following fact situation: Plaintiff's property was situated at the
corner of 8th Avenue and 155th Street in New York City. The city owned the
bed of 155th Street in fee, in trust for the public as a highway. The Harlem
River cut 155th Street east of plaintiff's property and 155th Street ascended a
bluff west of plaintiff's property at St. Nicholas Place. Pursuant to an enabling
statute of 1 8 8 7 ,i1 the city constructed a viaduct or elevated thoroughfare over
155th Street from the Harlem River crossing to the peak of the bluff at St.
Nicholas Place. The surface of 155th Street as it abutted plaintiff's property
remained free and unobstructed for public travel except for the viaduct founda-
tion abutments and a stairway leading to the viaduct from the street. Plaintiff
brought suit against the city alleging consequential damages to his parcel resulting
from the impairment of his easements of light, air, and access. With respect to
plaintiff's allegations of damage, the Court stated:
The Plaintiff has undoubtedly suffered consequential damages by
reason of the construction and maintenance of the viaduct for which
the legislature might properly provide. His ingress and egress, together
with the free and uninterrupted circulation of air and light have been
impaired, and the value of his property has been decreased by reason
of dust, dirt and noise occasioned by the structure.' 8
Having concluded that plaintiff in fact had suffered damage by virtue of the
city's construction, the Court turned to an analysis of plaintiff's legal right to
compensation, if any. Decreeing that an abutting owner's title was subject "to
all of the legitimate and proper uses to which the streets and public highways
may be devoted,"' 9 the Court concluded that, with the possible exception of
what it termed "extraordinary changes made for some ulterior purpose other
than the improvement of the street,"2 0 any change in the "natural contour" of
the street, including the construction of bridges and viaducts, necessary for the
promotion of the "free and easy passage of the public" could lawfully be made
without compensating the abutting owner. The implicit basis for the Sauer
decision was the Court's conclusion that damages such as those alleged by
16. 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1887, ch. 576.
18. 180 N.Y. 27, 30, 72 N.E. 579 (1904).
19. Id. at 31, 72 N.E. at 579.
20. Ibid.
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plaintiff were not compensable at common law and had not been made com-
pensable by legislation.
The Court of Appeals decision in Sauer was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court 2 ' on two grounds: (1) that plaintiff had been deprived of his
property without due process of law, and (2) that the state's action contravened
the constitutionally protected obligation of contracts. Both arguments were
rejected. The latter argument was largely based upon the unique pattern of
ownership of the bed of the street in Sauer and, as such, is of little significance
for a consideration of later cases, but the Supreme Court's disposition of the
former argument is, however, of great importance for an analysis of later cases.
The holding of the New York Court of Appeals was first summarized in the
following language:
The Court of Appeals denied the Plaintiff the relief which he sought,
upon the ground that under the law of New York he had no easements
of access, light, or air, as against any improvement of the street for the
purpose of adapting it to public travel. In other words, the Court in
effect decided that the property alleged to have been injured did not
exist.22
The Supreme Court then turned to an analysis of plaintiff's argument that he
had been deprived of his property without due process of law. Observing that
the law of New York governed the disposition of the question, the Court con-
cluded that New York law did not permit ownership of an easement "as against
the public use of the streets or any structures which may be erected upon the
street to subserve and promote that public use."123 Since the abutting owner
'"never owned the easements which he claimed,' 2 4 it followed that no violation of
the fourteenth amendment was shown.
A. The "No Taking" Cases
The rule of Sauer has many ramifications and many applications. The prob-
lem is presented in its purest form in the "no physical taking" cases insofar as
these cases make unnecessary the isolation of noncompensable items of damages
from admittedly compensable ones, as in the case of a taking of a part of a
piece of property. It is commonly recognized that the simple before and after
value often mentioned in the partial taking cases gives credit for noncompensable
damages, and the complex problems of isolating the collectable from the uncol-
lectable appear. In the no taking cases, however, the question is simplified: Can
the owner of the damaged property state a cause of action? The question may
arise where the grade of an abutting street is raised or lowered, 5 or the street is
21. 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
22. Id. at 542.
23. Id. at 548.
24. Ibid.
25. See, e.g., Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 A.D.2d 747, 253 N.Y.S.2d 713 (4th Dep't
1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1005, 212 N.E.2d 899, 65 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1965), amended, 17 N.Y.2d
661, 216 N.E.2d 601, 269 N.Y.S.2d 439, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 818 (1966); 240 Scott, Inc.
v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 299, 221 N.E.2d 456, 274 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1966).
EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW YORK
closed in one direction,20 or, more simply, where guardrails are placed between
the street and the property.27
1. Use of Regulatory Devices
Though not strictly speaking concerned with loss of access, Perlmutter v.
Greene2 8 is significant, because it raised the question of the means and extent to
which the state could alter a highway abutting claimant's land and as a result
adversely affect the commercial value of that land. Claimants, the lessees of land
abutting a state highway, proposed to erect a billboard on their land for adver-
tising purposes. The state erected a screen or shield on the highway in front of
the billboard. Noting that the highway was owned in fee by the state, Chief
Judge Pound stated, "When the fee of the highway has been transferred to the
State, the State may use the highway for any public purpose not inconsistent
with or prejudicial to its use for highway purposes. 2 9 The Court emphasized
that:
The mere disturbance of the rights of light, air and access of abutting
owners on such a highway by the imposition of a new use, consistent
with its use as an open public street, must be tolerated by them and no
right of action arises therefrom, although such use interferes with the
enjoyment of their premises.... This right to have the highway kept
open for light, air and access as well as for travel has been termed
an "easement" but it is the right deduced by way of consequence from
the purposes of a public street.30
Commenting that the erection of the screens was intended by the Superintendent
of Public Works "to make the highway free from sights which would offend the
public" and to improve highway safety by shutting "out from view scenes which
might distract the attention of the driver of a car," 3'1 the Court upheld the
state's action.
In subjugating the private owner's right of free and unlimited use of his
property to the general public's right to safe and convenient travel, the Court
took care to point out (1) that the state's modification of the highway was con-
sistent with its use as a street, and (2) that the highway remained in all respects
open to the abutting owner.
Perlmutter probably should be categorized as a "loss of view" case. Whether
restriction of view is a compensable damage item is not a simple question,
especially when it is realized that two separate aspects are involved-view of
the subject property and view from the subject property. Perlmutter answered
in the negative the question of whether loss of the view of a parcel of land was
26. See, e.g., Licht v. State, 277 N.Y. 216, 14 N.E.2d 44, reargument denied, 278 N.Y.
733, 17 N.E.2d 144 (1938).
27. See, e.g., Red Apple Restaurant, Inc. v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 203, 188 N.E.2d 137, 237
N.Y.S.2d 707 (1963).
28. 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).
29. Id. at 329-30, 182 N.E. at S.
30. Id. at 330, 182 NXE. at 5-6.
31. Id. at 331, 182 N.E. at 6.
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compensable. Keinz v. State 2 considered whether loss of view from a piece of
property created compensable damage.
In Keinz, claimants' land was adjacent to Irondequoit Bay and overlooked
the bay. The state appropriated a one foot strip of the claimants' land and used it
in the construction of a thirty-foot high highway embankment. Claimants argued
that they were damaged insofar as their view of the bay had been destroyed by
the embankment. In addition, a claim was made for loss of riparian rights. Con-
cluding that the market value of the land was considerably reduced by the ob-
struction of the view and the elimination of riparian rights, the Appellate Division
for the Fourth Department held:
We must determine the fair market value of the premises before and
after the appropriation, and if any factor having a bearing on that value
is disregarded, then the constitutional requirement of just compensation
is not satisfied. We believe that reductions in value due to impairment
in view must be considered. No appraiser could possibly isolate that
factor in his mind. A "willing purchaser" would not do so. Two proper-
ties might be physically identical, yet their value markedly different
because of the surroundings .... [T] he "view" might be a mountain
side or a valley as well as a lake. In either event, the view augments
the value of the premises, and if a portion thereof is taken and the
view is spoiled, the market value of the premises remaining is reduced.
The extent of the reduction is no more speculative than many other
factors affecting value. It may be a matter of judgment but it is also a
matter of dollars and cents, and a constitutional policy requires that
such reduction in value not be born [sic] by the owner whose property
is taken for a public purpose without his consent .... 33
The Keinz analysis appears to be equally persuasive regardless of whether loss
of view of or view from is involved. The courts, however, have not taken this
position; in fact, the Appellate Division for the Third Department, in Blair v.
State,' 4 on facts identical to Keinz, reached the opposite conclusion.
It is quite interesting to substitute loss of access for loss of view in the
court's analysis in the Keinz case. Significantly, the thrust of the constitutional
argument does not appear to be diminished by the substitution. However, as we
shall see, the courts have not elected to make this substitution in their considera-
tion of loss of access cases. One must restrict the Keinz case to its facts and,
Blair to the contrary notwithstanding, categorize the determinative factor in
32. 2 A.D.2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 505 (4th Dep't 1956), leave to appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d
815, 161 N.Y.S.2d 604 (4th Dep't 1957). See also Matter of East River Drive, 264 App. Div.
555, 35 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 843, 84 N.E.2d 148 (1949); Bopp v.
State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 227 N.E.2d 37, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1967); Note, 19 Ala. L. Rev. 202
(1966).
33. Keinz v. State, supra note 32 at 417, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 507 (Emphasis added.).
34. 19 A.D.2d 937, 244 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't 1963), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 700, 204 N.E.2d
338, 256 N.Y.2d 141 (1965). See also Feres v. State, 24 A.D.2d 661, 261 N.Y.S.2d 185 (3d
Dep't 1965) (holding loss of view in not to be compensable).
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awarding compensation as the damage resulting from the loss of view from the
property.
The facts of Jones Beach Blvd. Estates, Inc. v. Moses35 have been approxi-
mated in numerous cases in the expressway era. Plaintiff and its predecessor
in title sold strips of land to the Long Island State Park Commission for highway
purposes, reserving private driveway access rights to the roadway from the abut-
ting land on each side. However, subsequent to contruction the commission
ordered that U-turns were permitted only at a regular crossing. There was no
regular crossing for cars entering the southerly lane for a distance of five miles.
Thus a person entering from plaintiff's land west of the highway and intending
to drive north had to travel five miles south, change lanes, and travel five miles
north in order to cross the highway and begin his journey. Here were specifically
reserved easements of access, and the plaintiff argued that the regulation was an
unreasonable restriction upon both his common law and reserved rights. The
Court's answer was that "although the abutting owner may be inconvenienced
by a regulation, if it is reasonably adapted to benefit the traveling public, he
has no remedy unless given one by some express statute.136 A review of the
factors considered by the commission showed reasonable adaptation to the public
benefit, and plaintiff accordingly was denied injunctive relief.
The plaintiff seeking an injunction put forth a more tenuous argument in
Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of New York 37 with a predictable result. Unreason-
able interference with acceis was asserted in the placing of bus stops at the
curb-cuts of the service station owned by plaintiff. As a result, buses, during
rush hours, tended to stand in front of plaintiff's premises and obstruct the use of
the curb-cuts. The over-all effect of this interference with the curb-cuts was to
diminish the volume of plaintiff's business. Accordingly, the plaintiff contended
"that [its] ... right of ingress and egress is a 'paramount' property right and
that the maintenance of the bus stops constitutes an unreasonable interference
with that right."13 8 In answer to this argument Judge Fuld stated for the Court
that "on the contrary, it is the right of the public to the use of the streets which is
'absolute and paramount.' -39 Continuing, Judge Fuld emphasized that:
Any loss resulting from the interference with an abutting owner's enjoy-
ment of his property is damnum absque injuria and the owner must bear
it.... The interference here complained of must be shouldered by the
plaintiffs as one of the inconveniences to be born [sic] by the in-
dividual for the larger benefit of the community and the public in
general. 40
35. 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935).
36. Id. at 368, 197 N.E. at 315.
37. 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814, 180 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 934
(1959).
38. Id. at 115, 154 N.E.2d at 816, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 772, quoting from Jones Beach
Blvd. Estates v. Moses, 268 N.Y. 362, 368, 199 N.E. 313, 315 (1935).
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 117, 154 N.E.2d at 817, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
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2. Change of Grade and Circuity of Access
In Mirro v. State,41 a change of grade carried out pursuant to the terms of the
New York City Grade Crossing Elimination Act42 depressed the street in front
of claimant's property by eleven inches. Claimant had improved his property
in 1924 in reliance upon the grade as it then existed. Four years later the City of
New York eliminated a railroad grade crossing with the resultant depression of
the street. Although no part of claimant's property had actually been taken, the
Court allowed the claimant damages. The decision was based upon the New York
City Grade Crossing Elimination Act and the provision of the Greater New
York Charter. Section 2047 of the act provided that, "If the work of such eli-
mination causes damage to property not acquired as above provided, the State
shall be liable therefore in the first instance, but this provision shall not be
deemed to create any liability not already existing in law." Section 951 of the
Greater New York Charter added that, CAn abutting owner who has built upon
or otherwise improved his property in conformity with the grade of any street
or avenue established by lawful authority, and such grade is changed after such
buildings or improvement have been erected, and the lessee thereof, shall be
entitled to damages for such change of grade." The "exception" clause in the
Grade Crossing Elimination Act could arguably have been used to deny com-
pensation in Mirro. The existence of the charter provision, however, insured that
claimant would be compensated on the facts of Mirro. Desirable though this
result may be, Mirro serves (with the statutory cases to be subsequently dis-
cussed) as an example of the unpredictable disposition of claims, most often in
terms of a refusal to compensate, which is possible within the framework of the
many special statutes and charter provisions applicable to various types of loss
of access cases. In short, Mirro may be the exception that proves the rule, of
which Selig v. State43 is the landmark example.
Selig is in all probability the most often cited of the modern access cases.
The claim in Selig resulted from the construction of a portion of the New York
State Thruway over a part of what had been the roadbed of Central Avenue in
the City of Yonkers. The elevated Thruway and its retaining wall were con-
structed opposite the claimant's property. Prior to the Thruway construction,
Central Avenue was a two-way downtown thoroughfare. The new Thruway was
a limited access highway with service roads extending from each side of the road-
bed. Claimant's property abutted on one of the service roads which were designed
to accommodate south-bound traffic. Traffic in a northerly direction was forced to
use the service road on the other side of the Thruway and to cross over two other
streets in order to reach claimant's property. None of the claimant's property
was actually appropriated or used for purposes of the Thruway construction and
41. 260 App. Div. 525, 23 N.Y.S.2d 852 (3d Dep't 1940), aft'd, 285 N.Y. 678, 34 N.E.2d
378 (1941).
42. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 677.
43. 10 N.Y.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 59, 217 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
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the claim for damages was based upon change of grade and interference with the
access, light and air to portions of the property.
Section 347 of the New York Highway Law provided that, "If the work of
constructing, reconstructing and maintaining such state thruways and bridges
thereon causes damage to property not acquired as above provided, the state
shall be liable therefor, but this provision shall not be deemed to create any
liability not already existing by statute." Conceding that the section of the High-
way Law above quoted would permit compensation if there had been a change of
grade resulting from the construction undertaken by the city, the Court pointed
out that:
It has long been the rule in this state that consequential damages
may not be recovered by an abutting property owner for the diminu-
tion in value of his property because the state, in changing the course
of an adjoining highway, interferes with the access to his land or diverts
traffic therefrom. Damages resulting merely from circuity of access are
considered as damnum absque injuria .... 44
Stating that the claimant was left with free and uninterrupted access to the new
Thruway by the service road which remained at the grade of the claimant's prop-
erty, the Court concluded that there was no change of grade and no interference
with any recognized vested property right. Implicit in this holding is the Court's
acceptance of the "suitability" of the access provided by the service road not-
withstanding the obvious diminution both qualitatively and quantitatively of
access resulting from the substitution of the one way service road for the prior
unlimited access on a main thoroughfare.
While the Selig case is unquestionably consistent with prior holdings, the
Court's language indicates that there was some difficulty in resolving the damage
claim presented. The opinion states that:
In an attempt to afford claimant relief here, the chief judge now
would abandon a well-established rule and treat the change of grade
damages and the loss of access damages as one and the same. In his
view, the award may be sustained on the ground that the loss in value
of the property resulted directly from the change in grade. Our former
decisions definitely and unquestionably hold to the contrary, and, as we
said in Coffey v. State of New York ... while this may "appear to be
at variance with natural justice," our reversal "rests upon the soundest
legal reasons.1
45
The impact of Selig was, of course, not innovative, but rather lies in the fact
that the Court's opinion involved the collection and restatement of the theories
and principles denying relief, with the net result that the avenue of common
law change was closed. After Selig, the doctrine of stare decisis barred any break
in the common law reluctance to award relief. In short, all later cases answer the
problem with a single citation-Selig.40
44. Id. at 39, 176 N.E.2d at 61,217 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
45. Id. at 41, '176 N.E.2d at 62-63, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
46. See, e.g., the Oswego Boulevard Cases: Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 AD.2d 747,
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3. The Cul-de-Sac and Circuity of Access
As an incident to the construction of Long Island's Northern State Parkway,
certain roads were closed, including that which passed in front of the property of
the claimant in Licht v. State.47 All access to highways to the west was severed,
but, fortunately for the claimant, a statute insured recovery of damages. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the claimant presented a valid claim within the
statutory assumption of liability:
It is true that there has been no formal appropriation, but without
formal appropriation all access to claimant's property from the west has
been cut off physically by the fill placed upon the surface of the road to
support the parkway. A cul-de-sac to the west replaces an exit to Mar-
cus Avenue, to the new parkway, and to any highway or street. This
was not a change of grade. It was more. It comprised a wiping out of the
interest of the claimants in this highway to the west.
48
Licht is an unusual case insofar as an assumption of liability by legislative
act is unusual in this area. Although the statute made no specific mention of
access restriction, the Court in Licht, by "interpretation," brought the claim for
relief within the purview of the statute, something the New York courts, as
in Selig, have been consistently unwilling to do.
In the change of grade area, there are partial statutory assumptions of
liability,49 and other examples of legislation of a more or less limited nature.50
To some, as we have seen, is attached the proviso that "this provision shall not
be deemed to create any liability not already existing in law." It requires little
insight to pick out the built-in ambiguity, if one chooses to view such a section
as assumptive of liability, i.e., if these acts were not intended to expand common
law liability they presumably would not have been passed. Although the legis-
lature may, by passage of these acts, have intended to broaden the spectrum of
compensable damage resulting from deprivation of access, the courts have taken
the contrary course in utilizing the limiting clauses to restrict the categories of
compensable damage. Dwornik v. State5 is an example.
Dwornik involved a grade crossing elimination. The Buffalo grade crossing
statute provided that the state should be liable in the first instance for damage
253 N.Y.S.2d 713 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1005, 212 N.E.2d 899, 265 N.Y.S.2d 664
(1965), amended, 17 N.Y.2d 661, 216 N.E.2d 601, 269 N.Y.S.2d 439, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
818 (1966); National Biscuit Co. v. State, 14 A.D.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 905, afJ'd, 11 N.Y.2d
743, 181 N.E.2d 457, 226 N.Y.S.2d 445, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924 (1962); Hall & McChesney,
Inc. v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 748, 182 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Ct. Cl. 1959), aff'd, 11 A.D.2d 899, 205
N.Y.S.2d 1023, leave to appeal denied, 11 A.D.2d 977, 209 N.Y.S.2d 542 (4th Dep't 1960);
A. E. Nettleton Co. v. State, 11 A.D.2d 899, 202 N.Y.S.2d 102 (4th Dep't 1960).
47. 277 N.Y. 216, 14 N.E.2d 44, reargument denied, 278 N.Y. 733, 17 N.E.2d 144 (1938).
See also Note, 18 Ala. L. Rev. 315 (1966).
48. 277 N.Y. 216, at 222, 14 N.E.2d 44, at 45 (1938).
49. N.Y. Highway Law § 197; N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 99; N.Y. Village Law
§ 159.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 576 § 12.
51. 251 App. Div. 675, 297 N.Y. Supp. 409 (4th Dep't 1937), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 597, 28
N.E.2d 21 (1940). See also Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 227 N.E.2d 37, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135
(1967).
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to property resulting from a grade crossing elimination which had not actually
been acquired by the state-with the proviso discussed above. The damage
resulted from the incidental permanent closing of two streets which allegedly cut
off access to claimant's premises from various other parts of these streets. The
Court of Appeals held that since there was no "change of grade" and claimant's
property was not cut off from all means of ingress and egress, there could be no
common law liability of the state to the owner and, in light of the fact that the
statute by its express terms did not create any new liability, there could be no
recovery. The Court emphasized that where the street closing did not completely
wipe out the claimant's access and the claimant was left with some minimal means
of ingress and egress, there could be no common law liability. The primary con-
sideration was the presence or absence of access with no attention being paid to
the possible adverse effects upon the commercial or residential suitability of the
property. The fact that claimant's right of action was statutory had no dis-
cernible effect upon the Court insofar as the "exception" clause was utilized to
transform the suit into what might be called a "common law" case.
4. Temporary Restriction of Access
Temporary restriction of access can result from a number of construction
activities of governmental units. It is the area in which the equities most highly
and most often favor the "condemnor." Highway construction, with few excep-
tions, and all repairs, restrict someone's access. The number of people affected
to some degree by each act could be vast. In many repair situations is the
anomaly that the claimant could win or lose on the same argument whether or
not the repair is made. Failure to perform the duty to repair restricts access as
much as the usual blockage required to repair. For numerous reasons, only the
most severe temporary restriction cases can be considered to be at all meritori-
ous.r12 To date, even those have ended without recovery of damages.
Two claims for damage arising out of a railroad grade crossing elimination
were considered by the Court of Appeals in Coffey v. State.53 Railroad tracks were
temporarily relocated in the street adjoining claimants' property and a new
structure was erected to permanently elevate them. None of the claimants'
property was actually taken. Claimants contended (1) that the rental value of
their property was practically destroyed for a time, by the relocation of the
railroad tracks in the street during the construction of the new structure to
permanently elevate them, and (2) that permanent damage to the fee value of
their premises resulted from the permanent obstruction and interference with the
easements of light, air, and access to the premises. The state contested only the
first claim. The governing statute was similar to the legislative enactments in-
volved in Mirro and Selig. The Court first commented that the statutory provision
had been interpreted to mean "that if there was a remedy available to such
52. See generally Netherton, Control of Highway Access 82 (1963).
53. 291 N.Y. 494, 53 NE.2d 362 (1943).
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injured property owner at the time the act took effect, the state agrees to pay;
but if there was not, the statute is not to be taken as creating any new liability."5 4
Applying this interpretation to claimant's first claim for damage (the only dis-
puted claim), the Court concluded that claimant could not recover: "We do not
find that there ever existed any right of action for temporary (or permanent)
damage consisting of partial loss of access and resulting inconvenience to an
abutting property owner caused by the erection of a grade crossing elimination
structure in the adjacent street.155
While the conclusion of the Court is predictable and compatible with prior
authority, Coffey is significant because it serves, with the other "statutory" cases
discussed, as an example of the varying results possible under the grade crossing
elimination statutes. Slight factual differences and minor differences in statutory
language combine to produce diverse results in these cases. This is perhaps of
even greater significance in that it points up the difficulties and shortcomings
of the remedial statute methods of redressing a situation where hardship is created
by the lack of a "common law" method of dealing with the problem.
Beck v. State5 6 considered the question of whether an abutting owner whose
land was made inaccessible for approximately nine months by State Thruway
construction could collect damages for resultant business losses. Claimants
operated an automobile agency and gasoline station on the subject parcel and
there was no question that Thruway construction severely diminished the volume
of their business. Conceding that both section 347 of the New York Highway Law
and the Yonkers City Charter might impose liability upon the state regardless of
the fact that none of claimant's land was in fact appropriated, the Court rejected
the claim for damages on the ground that "the cases uniformly hold that there
can be recovery only if access is destroyed permanently rather than temporar-
fly . . . ."57 The unfairness of the decision apparently did not sit well with the
Court since it also stated that "it may well be that claimants suffered dis-
proportionately because of their location or the nature of their businesses .... ,,5f
This fact notwithstanding, however, the Court was emphatic in its rejection of
the damage claim in the absence of a showing of permanent loss of access.
The Court's insistence that a finding of constructive appropriation turned
upon the permanency of the loss of access seems to be but another example of
the generally mechanistic approach used by our courts in deciding access cases.
The use of "permanency" as the standard may have the advantage of definite-
ness and ease of application but is inadequate, because it is totally divorced from
54. Id. at 497, 53 N.E.2d at 364, quoting from Askey & Hager, Inc. v. State, 240 App.
Div. 451, 453-54, 270 N.Y. Supp. 704-07 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 587, 195 N.E. 212
(1935). See also N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 678 § 6.
55. Id. at 497, 53 N.E.2d at 364.
56. 21 A.D.2d 939, 251 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1964).
57. Id. at 940, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 289 (Emphasis added.). But see O'Brien v. New York
C. & H.R.R., 148 App. Div. 733, 738 (2d Dep't 1912) (Temporary complete landlocking
may be compensable.).
58. 21 A.D.2d at 940, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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the only real indicator of the impact of loss of access on a parcel of land, i.e.,
damages resulting from the diminution of an industrial, commercial, or residential
use. Loss of access may result in crippling or totally destroying a business use of
property without being in fact "permanent." The unwillingness of the courts to
apply this distinction to loss of access cases continues to result in this perplexing
and unfair disposition of cases.
B. The "Partial Taking" Cases
Partial taking cases do not differ from no taking cases in concept but are
made difficult by the necessity of discussing dollars and cents as a result of the
actual appropriation. There is direct damage-the actual taking-for which com-
pensation must be made. It is a temptation for claimants and sympathetic courts
to enhance the direct damage figure by inclusion of a gratuity to cover loss of
access. There may also be consequential damages (for example, severance dam-
age) and it is even easier to conceal noncompensable damages under that head-
ing. Four of the multitude of cases illustrate the problems.
Van Aken v. State 9 is the earliest of the four, and in it the question of
recoverability of damages for circuity of access is posed, but with a twist, for
a miniscule strip of land also was taken. The two sections of plaintiff's farm
were divided by a railroad right of way and communication between the two
parcels was possible only over the grade crossing in question. With the elimination
of the grade crossing, communication between the two sections was possible only
by traveling a distance of a half-mile over roads running along the outer fringes
of claimant's land.
The Court first pointed out that the grounds for any recovery must be found
in the Grade Crossing Elimination Act of 192800 That act permitted an abutting
owner to present a claim for the value of "such property appropriated and for
legal damages," with the now familiar restriction to already existing liability.
Emphasizing that the elimination of the grade crossing left plaintiff with access
to a highway from each section of his land, the Court denied recovery. The
rationale for the decision turned upon the Court's determination that within the
meaning of the Grade Crossing Elimination Act, plaintiff's claim called for the
creation of a "liability not already existing in law." The Court's determination
that damages caused by circuity of access were not compensable at common law
was not supported by the citation of authority and apparently turned upon the
Court's finding that plaintiff was left with access to a highway from each section
of his land. The finding of "access in fact" was thus sufficient to deny recovery
without regard to the probable diminution in quantity and quality of the access.
The technique of the Court in utilizing the legislative exception to the statutory
right to recovery, though arguably correct, again points up the shortcomings of
such legislation.
59. 261 N.Y. 360,185 N.E. 497 (1933).
60. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 678.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
One case which apparently approached the loss of access problem somewhat
differently than the foregoing was Board of Supervisors v. Wilkin.01 A part of
claimant's land was condemned for use in the construction of a state parkway.
The remainder of claimant's land, upon which was constructed a substantial
residence, was left between an adjoining lake and the parkway without access to
the parkway. Though the parcel in question might have had access to the park-
way as a matter of law, the Court stated that "this parkway is a part of the State
park system, and while it will have a road for travel running through it, neverthe-
less it is essentially a park." 62 More significantly, the Court stated: "The rule
laid down in Perlmutter v. Greene ... that the 'right to have the highway kept
open for ... access as well as for travel [is] an easement,' is not applicable to a
parkway of the kind here contemplated. ... ,,13 Stating that the instant case was
"wholly unlike" the cases considering damage resulting from change of grade, the
Court emphasized that: "Here the damage is caused by the taking, not by what
may or may not be done with the land. Cutting off a portion of the owners' land
from access to a highway results in immediate damage. Its usefulness, and so its
market value, is almost if not entirely destroyed.164
The Court's apparent utilization of the standard of "use" in terms of market
value would seem to be an approach superior to that used in prior cases. The
importance of Wilkin is still somewhat diminished by the fact that the state
apparently did not provide claimant with a means of access to the parkway.
Thus, insofar as the Wilkin case held that claimant was entitled to compensation
because his property was completely cut off from surrounding highways, it is
merely a "common law" application of the principles applied by way of statutory
interpretation in the Licht case. 65
The controlled access problem was again presented to the Court of Appeals
in the leading case of Red Apple Restaurant v. McMorran.A Claimant's land
fronted along both the east and west side of a highway and was used for various
commercial purposes which included a restaurant, parking, service and rest areas,
a gasoline station, and a vehicle repair shop. The state appropriated a part of
61. 260 App. Div. 366, 22 N.Y.S.2d 465 (4th Dep't 1940).
62. Id. at 368, 22 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
63. Ibid.
64. 260 App. Div. at 368-69, 22 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
65. The Wilkin case should be read against the background of cases such as Griefer v.
Board of Supervisors, 246 App. Div. 385, 286 N.Y. Supp. 791 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273
N.Y. 515, 6 N.E.2d 606, reargument denied, 274 N.Y. 587, 10 N.E.2d 564 (1937), and Robin-
son v. State, 3 A.D.2d 326, 160 N.Y.S.2d 439 (3d Dep't 1957), in which it is made clear
that in ordinary circumstances where property is taken for highway purposes, all of it is a
highway. If a person owns land next to that highway land, he has whatever rights a high-
way abutter has-whether the immediately adjacent land is improved as a highway or not.
An example is found in Idylbrook Farms, Inc. v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 10, 266 N.Y.S.2d 540
(Ct. Cl. 1963), aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 761, 253 N.Y.S.2d 747 (4th Dep't 1964), where an adjacent
highway was moved away from claimant's land. The old abandoned highway strip separated
claimant's property from the new highway. Because the abandoned highway site was still
highway land, claimant retained the right to cross it to reach the new facility. This was
subject, of course, to subsequent police power regulation. Claimant also retained the first
rights against the abandoned highway site if it were sold for private use.
66. 12 N.Y.2d 203, 188 NXE.2d 137, 237 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1963) (per curiam).
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claimant's land for highway purposes and erected guard rails which prevented
access to and from the highway except at the entrances and exits provided through
the guardrails. Again, the claimant argued that his property had unlawfully been
deprived of its access to the arterial highway. The actual, if not apparent, basis
for the claim was the potential reduction in traffic flow into claimant's property
with its adverse impact upon the volume of business. Rejecting claimant's con-
tention, the Court of Appeals held:
We think, to the contrary, that under the Highway Law, and under the
police power, and to effectuate a reasonably safe channelling of traffic,
the State had a right to erect upon the property appropriated the guard-
rails in question. The guardrails, as erected, did not create a non access
highway or bar access to the premises in question but left ample room
for ingress and egress.67
Again, the establishment of the fact of access without regard to its quantitative
diminution and the resultant impact upon the business use of the property was
sufficient to defeat the landowner's claim for damages.
Northern Lights Shopping Center, Inc. v. State6" presented the often re-
peated fact pattern of a commercial property, usually a shopping center with
unlimited access on arterial highways, being left with restricted access service
roads as a result of the actual appropriation of a narrow strip of highway abutting
land and the construction of a limited access highway. Claimant's shopping
center was bounded by three highways and a service road. Two of the highways
were heavily travelled. The state appropriated a portion of claimant's land for
purposes of constructing a traffic circle and elevating a new highway. The net
result was that claimant's property, after the construction, fronted on a controlled
access highway with guard rails which were intended to give preference to
"through" traffic. Service roads were also provided. Claimant contended that the
limitation of access and the alteration of the traffic pattern seriously damaged
its business. Holding that claimant had no right to consequential damages result-
ing from the alteration of its access, the Court emphasized that the property was
left with "reasonable" alternative means of access via service roads and that
alleged damages resulting from circuity of access were not compensable. The
underlying rationale for the opinion was that the "State's exercise of its police
power in such situations [was] . . . predominant and controlling .... 2,69 The
property owner's right to direct and uninterrupted access was said to be "subject
to the fullest reasonable exercise of the public's primary right of travel ..... 0
Again, the magnitude of the business losses involved was of no consequence in
the determination of whether the alternative means of access were reasonable.
67. Id. at 206, 188 N.E.2d at 138, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
68. 20 AJ).2d 415, 47 N.Y.S.2d 333 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d
333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 134, amended, 15 N.Y.2d 960, 207 N.E.2d 521, 259 N.Y.S.d 849, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 826 (1965).
69. Id. at 420, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
70. Id. at 421, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
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C. The "Constructive Taking" Cases
The constructive taking cases are those rare cases in which the restriction
upon access is so severe as to in effect cut off all suitable access. A non-taking or
a partial taking becomes a complete taking. The extreme is a complete landlock-
ing,71 and there the answer is clear. The land has an after-appropriation value of
roughly zero, with sale to an adjoining landowner as the only good prospect in
most cases. What is the dividing line between that and the mere non-compensable
restriction case? The cases on that point are inconclusive and may not even be
correctly decided. Possibly only a substantial reduction in the "best" use is
required, but even that is doubtful.
Holmes v. State72 ushered in what might be called the modern line of cases
dealing with loss of access resulting from an eminent domain taking. The state
appropriated a perpetual easement over a very small portion of claimants' land
in connection with a railroad grade crossing elimination. As a result of this
appropriation, claimants' land, upon which was operated a feed business, was
deprived of the direct access it had previously enjoyed to an adjoining avenue,
although it was still possible to reach the avenue from claimants' land by a
circuitous route. The trial court held that the deprivation of access may have in
fact resulted in damages, but that any such damage to claimant was damnurn
absque injuria. On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that
consequential damages did not flow from the appropriation of the perpetual ease-
ment, but questioned the finding below that claimants were left with a suitable
means of access to the property. The court found that prior to appropriation,
ninety per cent of the claimants' feed business was transacted by farmers calling
at the feed mill to make purchases, whereas after the appropriation of the per-
petual easement and the commencement of construction on the grade crossing
elimination the claimants were compelled to deliver more than ninety per cent of
the merchandise to their customers. Notwithstanding that "new inconvenience
does not stamp a means of access as unsuitable,"73 the court nonetheless was
"constrained to hold that the finding of the court below to the effect that
claimants were not cut off from all other suitable means of ingress and egress is
against the weight of evidence."74 The judgment below was reversed and a new
trial was ordered.
When the case again reached the Appellate Division,75 the issue before the
court was stated as follows: "This appeal involves only consequential damage
from loss of business because of the difficulty of access."17 6 The court again stated
71. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.32(2), at 420 (3d ed. 1950).
72. 201 Misc. 640, 111 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Ct. Cl. 1951), rev'd, 279 App. Div. 489, 111
N.Y.S.2d 634 (3d Dep't 1952).
73. 279 App. Div. at 491, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
74. Id. at 492, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 637. See also Giarrusso v. State, 19 A.D.2d 582, 240
N.Y.S.2d 579 (4th Dep't 1963).
75. Holmes v. State, 282 App. Div. 278, 123 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1953), afirming
204 Misc. 9, 123 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
76. Id. at 279, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
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the rule with regard to the closing of a street as follows: "When a street is
closed, if suitable means of access is not left to an owner of property, he is entitled
to damages caused by the closing. . . ."7 In holding that the damage was more
than inconvenience and that the street closing deprived the claimants' property
of a suitable means of access, the court stated that: "The evidence over-
whelmingly establishes that claimants suffered substantial damage. The only
remaining access, after the street closing, was round-about, narrow, involved diffi-
cult turns and meeting places, to which claimants' former customers would not
submit."78
The finding by the Appellate Division in Holmes that the claimant who is
deprived of access must be left with an alternative method of access which is
reasonable within all the circumstances is of course consistent with prior hold-
ings, and does not present any novel legal analysis. However, Holmes type
cases are significant in that the courts took into consideration an alteration in the
claimants' method of business and volume of business as an indicator of the
suitability of the alternative means of access provided the claimants after the
destruction of the original means of access. In addition, and contrary to the
rules that would be stated in later cases, the Appellate Division seemed to be
premising their holding that the alternative means of access was insufficient
primarily upon the fact that claimants' customers were forced to take a more
circuitous route in reaching claimants' property. Holmes antedated all of the
modern definitive access cases. Would the result be the same today? We think not.
Meloon Bronze Foundry, Inc. v. State0 was a change of grade case involv-
ing a fact pattern not covered by any of the change of grade statutes. The fact
that the property was left, after an appropriation, without a suitable substitute
means of access was found by the court to constitute a "virtual taking" which
reduced the fair market value of the property. The court awarded damages in
the amount of the reduction." Meloon left unanswered a number of questions.
For example, given the fact that a great number of the cases in which recovery
was denied presented a loss of value exceeding ten per cent of the market value,
why was compensation awarded in Meloon, a case involving less than a ten per
cent loss? The question might be posed whether Meloon stands for the proposition
that access can be unsuitable even if the value is not substantially diminished. If
this is true, it is possible that the determinative factor in Meloon was a diminu-
tion of what might be called the underlying economic value of the property. The
court did not say this and an explanation of Meloon on this basis must remain
conjecture.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. 8 Misc. 2d 286, 166 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Ct. C1. 1957), rev'd, 6 A.D.2d 993, 176 N.Y.S.2d
452 (4th Dep't 1958), on remand, 18 Misc. 2d 403, 191 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Ct. C1. 1959), modified,
10 A.D.2d 905, 200 N.Y.S.2d 563 (4th Dep't 1960).
80. Meloon Bronze Foundry, Inc. v. State, 10 0A.D.2d 905, 200 N.Y.S.2d 563 (4th Dep't
1960).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The various fact patterns involved in the foregoing cases8l make it abun-
dantly clear that the courts of New York have generally elected not to award
abutting owners compensation for damages resulting from deprivation of access.
The many remedial statutes and municipal legislative acts have by and large
failed to expand the range of compensation for want of clear draftsmanship and
because of judicial emasculation of the apparent legislative intent. The remainder
of this article will consider whether a reversal of this case law trend is possible
from within the judiciary and, if not, whether other avenues for change are
available.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. In General
The foregoing sections have been devoted to a case by case examination of
the development of the New York law as it relates to damage claims arising out
of loss of access in the various senses in which that term has come to be under-
stood. With the possible exception of the cases recognized as dependent upon
statute, each claim for compensation was at least partially based upon either or
both the federal and state constitutional mandates of compensation for public
takings of private property. An evaluation of the prior law and any suggestions
for future changes in the law cannot seriously be advanced without a full under-
standing of the scope and limitations of the constitutional provisions. The pos-
sibility, both theoretical and practical, of the invocation of constitutional limita-
tions by the United States Supreme Court to reverse the trend of the New York
cases must also be explored.
The last clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, not by its terms applicable to the state governments, reads "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '82 The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held by the United States
Supreme Court to impose a similar limitation upon the states.8 3 The present New
81. Somewhat beyond the scope of this article, although restriction of access is a major
consideration, are the "potential taking" cases. See, e.g., Jafco Realty Corp. v. State, 18
A.D.2d 74, 238 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep't 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 556, 198 N.E.2d 39, 248
N.Y.S.2d 651 (1964), and Clark v. State, 20 A.D.2d 182, 245 N.Y.S.2d 787 (4th Dep't 1964),
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 990, 207 N.E.2d 606, 260 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1965), involving the taking of an
easement for public benefit with the fee owner being left with the rights of a user as long
as the use did not interfere with the easements. In both cases access across the easement was
vital to the claimant(s). The Clark case, three cases argued together, was a test case. Power
Authority easements were taken from 894 owners and about 180 cases remain unsettled.
State financial exposure, if the easements were held to deprive the owners of suitable access,
was huge. In Jalco all access to the property could be severed. The courts held that the
easements did not presently deprive the owners of access, but that future exercise by the
state of any rights under the easements to deprive the owners of their property would be
considered new de facto appropriations. Because the damage, if any, would accrue in the
future, so too would the cause of action.
82. U.S. Const. amend. V.
83. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266
(1943); Chicago, B. & O.R.R. v. Chicago , 166 U.S. 266 (1897); Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888); see also 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 1.3 (3rd ed. 1950).
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York Constitution, article 1, section 7(a) reads similarly: "Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."8 4 The New York
document, with familiai pervasiveness, leaves nothing to be implied, declaring
in Article 1, section 10, that while all land is allodial, "the people of the state, in
their right of sovereignty, possess original and ultimate property in and to all
lands within the jurisdiction of the state."85 Within the meaning of these pro-
visions, it must now be determined whether and to what extent the rights of the
abutting owner are protected.
The prevailing rationale of many, if not all, of the cases discussed previously
can be summarized in accordance with a general rule of priority, the ease of
statement of which tends to obscure its difficulty of understanding. On the one
hand, there is the private right of the abutting landowner to unlimited access to a
highway. Conflicting with this right is the right of the public to regulate highway
access in order to facilitate safe and efficient transportation. Where these counter-
vailing public and private rights clash, as they often do, the courts generally hold,
in one way or another, that the right of the public to safe and unlimited use of
the highways "predominates"8 6 over the subordinate rights of the abutting owners
with the consequence that damage or inconvenience to the abutting owner inci-
dental to government regulation of highways for the public benefit is not com-
pensable and must be borne by the abutting land owners. Stated in another way,
the rule is that the public's right to safe and convenient travel on public highways
is "paramount. 8 7
It is generally agreed that the denial or restriction of access, whether or not
there is an ordinarily protectable property interest in access, must, at least in
theory, be considered a police power regulation.8 8 Certainly, the valuable attribute
has been destroyed rather than appropriated to public use.89 Without question,
84. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 7(a).
85. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 10. It might be questioned whether § 10, except insofar as
it allows escheat, is necesary at all in view of the judicial opinion that the power of
eminent domain is an "inherent attribute of sovereignty." Matter of Board of Water Supply
of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 455, 14 N.E.2d 789, 790 (1938), citing Heyward v. Mayor, 7
N.Y. 314 (1852); Drake v. Hudson R. Ry., 7 Barb. 508, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). Of
course, it might also be questioned whether the constitutional "just compensation" mandate
is required since compensation may be ordered as an aspect of "natural equity." See Gardner
v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161 (N.Y. 1816); People ex rel. N.Y. C. & H.R.R.
v. Priest, 206 N.Y. 274, 289, 99 N.E. 547, 552 (1912) ("natural right and justice"). The
United States Supreme Court in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871), expressed
the view that the various constitutional provigions merely placed a common law right "be-
yond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control." Id. at 178-79.
86. See, e.g., Covey, Right of Access and the Illinois Highway Program, 47 Ill. B.J.
634 (1959).
87. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
88. Comment, Eminent Domain v. Police Power as Related to the Abutting Owner's
Right of Access, 14 Baylor L. Rev. 70 (1962).
89. See Campbell, The Limited Access Highway-Some Aspects of Compensation, 8
Utah L. Rev. 12, 19 (1962). This police power theory is identical to the one upon which
rests the law of zoning. Application of the theory here should be much less objectionable to
many conservative minds since access regulation may be obviously and closely related to the
needs of public safety, while use and area restrictions are generally applied to aesthetic or
at least more abstract public welfare purposes.
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where there has been no taking of tangible real property at all, this analysis can-
not be faulted. Although more often criticized, the same analysis would seem to
be equally applicable in the partial taking cases. 0 The simplest case involves
the taking of land from one side of the property with the simultaneous cutting
off of access to a highway abutting the property. In this situation, the govern-
ment actions falling under the police power and eminent domain power may be
separated, both temporally and spatially. The last case does not differ in concept
from that in which a narrow strip of land is taken and put to use as a limited
access highway (replacing a free access highway) or even for a row of inter-
connected guardrails which effectively severs access.
Conceptually then, the taking of real property is compensable when it is put
to public use; the cutting off of access is non-compensable if it is a separate
regulatory act. The economic realities, however, of both the hybrid and pure
regulation cases make the accuracy of this entire schema, in terms of explaining
the New York cases, suspect. The conceptually separate taking and regulation
have an economically inseparable impact upon the property. If, as the cases and
authorities uniformly state, the property owner must be compensated for what he
lost rather then for what the governmental authority has obtained,9' it is difficult
to rationalize the cases in terms of the police power-eminent domain dichotomy
when the regulation may strip the property of ninety per cent of its economic
worth, notwithstanding the fact that the actual physical taking may have
negligible consequences. If regulation rather than actual taking has the primary
economic impact upon the property value, it becomes essential to define the con-
stitutional limitations, if any, upon the police power basis for regulation.
B. The Scope of the Police Power and Possible Limitations
While the police power has been variously defined, all of the courts and
commentators agree, subject only to slight semantic differences, that the police
power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty through which the state acts to
protect or promote the public welfare . 2 So essential is the police power to the
maintenance of the orderly processes of government and communal living, that it
has been held on numerous occasions to be the "least limitable"0 3 of governmental
powers and, once exercised, "well-nigh conclusive"94 in its effect. The inevitable
conflict between the police power and the rights of private citizens and the gen-
erally accepted resolution of this conflict is succinctly stated in one of the treatises
90. It is suggested, erroneously it would seem, in Havran, Eminent Domain and the
Police Power, 5 Notre Dame Law. 380, 384 (1930), that the distinction is only clear at a
distance, and fades as one draws nearer.
91. See, e.g., Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)
(per Holmes, J.). The warning must continually be restated that the measure of damages is
fair market value absent any factor of special value to the owner.
92. See generally 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 259 (1963); 9 N.Y. Jur.
Constitutional Law § 143; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 174 passim (1955); Cushman &
Cushman, Cases On Constitutional Law 568 (1st ed. 1958).
93. 6 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 24.03, at 446 (3d ed. 1949). See also Freund,
Police Power § 1 (1904).
94. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 28, 32 (1954) (per Douglas, J.).
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as follows: "all businesses and occupations and all movements and activities
of the citizen in public relations are carried on subject to the reasonable exercise
of the police power. Obviously individual freedom must yield to the enforcement
of just regulation for the public good." 95
The validity of an exercise of the police power depends in the first instance
upon whether it is being used to conserve the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the public. If this query is answered in the affirmative, it must then be
determined whether the means employed have a "substantial relation to the
public objects which the government may legally accomplish .... ,96 An affirma-
tive answer to this inquiry seems to indicate that the exercise of the police power
in question is prima facie valid. The crucial question then becomes whether it
follows as a necessary conclusion from this line of reasoning that any damage to
the property of a private citizen incidental to a valid exercise of the police power
is damnum absque injuria.
As was discussed previously, the apparent conflict between the promotion of
the public interest via the police power and the protection of private rights
through the eminent domain mandate of compensation for a taking is reconcilable
conceptually if not "economically.S 97 This observation suggests the question
whether police power regulation can ever be said to be so severe as to amount to
a taking and as such entitle the private property owner to compensation. This
question was anticipated by Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell
9 8
where he cautioned against an overly-strict application of the due process pro-
hibitions in the exercise of the police power:
[W] e must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Four-
teenth Amendment to a drily logical extreme .... We have f~w scien-
tifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it is often difficult to mark
the line where what is called the police power of the states is limited by
the Constitution of the United States, judges should be slow to read into
the latter a nolumus mutare as against the law-making power.99
This language is, of course, a recognition that social, economic, and political
growth are to a great extent dependent upon the ability of the state to make
dynamic and imaginative use of the police power. Mr. Justice Holmes later
had occasion to reconsider the problem in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'00
where he commented that:
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
95. 6 McQuillan, op. cit. supra note 93, at 449.
96. Id. at § 32.04, at 572.
97. See Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not To Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 587 (1961); Covey, Highway Protection Through Control of Access and Roadside
Development, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 567; Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain From
Police Power and Tort, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 607 (1963).
98. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
99. Id. at 110.
100. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of
the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in
all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act .... The general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.'0 '
In applying Justice Holmes' test, the "extent" of the diminution of the
private citizen's property value must first be determined. If regulation reaches a
"certain magnitude" so that it is reasonable to conclude that the "regulation goes
too far," the examining court must conclude that there has been a taking. The
use of this formula is apparently not dependent upon the finding of a "direct" or
"actual" taking. Thus, the Supreme Court held in Portsmouth Harbor Land &
Hotel Co. v. United States 0 2 that "if the acts amounted to a taking, without
assertion of an adverse right, a contract would be implied whether it was thought
of or not."' 0 3 It remains to be determined whether the test proposed by Mr.
Justice Holmes continues to be a viable standard for ascertaining whether police
power regulation has become a taking.
It will be recalled that Justice Holmes stated in the Mahon case that the
limitations on the exercise of the police power were to be found in the contract
and due process clauses of the United States Constitution. 04 The possibility of
utilizing the contract clause in this respect must be considered in terms of
several Supreme Court cases involving the question of whether the police power
could be used to facilitate governmental action which arguably encroached upon
the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts.10 5 These
decisions, dating from the early nineteenth century and culminating in the
landmark opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell,06 apparently sanctioned a limited legislative encroachment on the
vested property rights supposedly protected by the contract clause. In addition,
it should be recognized that the practical importance of substantive due process
as a device for regulating governmental exercise of the police power has greatly
diminished from its nineteenth century zenith. An unbroken line of Supreme
101. Id. at 415 (Emphasis added.). See also Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util.
Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Brandeis, J.), and the excellent collation and analysis of Mr.
justice Holmes' opinions in this area in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J.
36 (1964).
102. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
103. Id. at 330. (Emphasis added.). See also Corwin, The Constitution of the United
States of America 864-72, 1062-68 (2d ed. 1952).
104. See generally Corwin, Liberty Against Government (1948); Corwin, The Twi-
light of the Supreme Court, ch. 2 (1934) ; Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause,
58 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944); Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the
Supreme Court, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 943 (1927); Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366 (1911).
105. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810); Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880). See generally Wright, The Con-
tract Clause of the Constitution (1938).
106. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
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Court cases have rejected attempts to overturn legislation regulating commodity
prices, working conditions, public health, minimum wages, and land use on the
ground that such legislation is violative of due process.10 7 These cases certainly
do not overrule Makon but it is only within their frame of reference that Makon's
present potential as an inhibiting force on the exercise of the police power can be
assessed.
Assuming without conceding that substantive due process remains at least in
theory a limitation upon the unlimited exercise of the police power by a state or
its instrumentalities, it becomes of great importance to fix the scope of the
constitutional prohibition in terms of the nature and extent of the property rights
protected.0 8A subsequent section of this article considers the question of whether
the abutter's easement of access is in fact an "interest" or "right" in property. 10 9
The conclusion reached with respect to New York law is that though the early
Elevated Railway cases appeared to recognize the easement of access as a prop-
erty right, later cases restricted those holdings to the unique facts presented and
apparently repudiated any general judicial interpretation in favor of the existence
of such a property right.") On the basis of an examination and analysis of the
treatises, it is suggested that the right of access might be categorized as a negative
easement incidental to the ownership of the abutting parcel.-" There is, however,
some indication that the Supreme Court, in applying the constitutional prohibi-
tions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, has elected to take a somewhat
broader view of the definition of property "rights" or "interests."
It has been suggested that the prohibition against "taking" private property
for public use without paying just compensation contained in the fifth amendment
is designed to protect the "economic interest" of the individual in his property.
Thus, in Armstrong v. United States,: 2 the Supreme Court held that the destruc-
tion of liens on property through government acquisition constituted a "taking"
and stated that: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was to bar government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which in all fairness and
justice should be borne by the public as a whole." 113 Similarly, the Court in
107. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Hamilton, The Path oj Due Process of Law, in The Constitution Re-
considered (Conyers Reed ed., 1938). It is of some interest to compare what can be termed
the national decline of substantive due process as an inhibiting force on legislative exercise
of the police power with what is viewed by some as the persistence of substantive due
process in the states. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34; Paulson, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 92 (1950).
108. See Sax, supra note 101, at 43-46; Miller, An Affirmative Thrust of Due Process
of Law, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399 (1962); see also Mason & Beaney, American Constitu-
tional Law 289-377 (3d ed. 1964).
109. See infra. notes 140-77 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
112. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
113. Id. at 49.
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United States v. General Motors Corp.114 stated the nature and limits of a fifth
amendment "taking" in the following language:
It ... denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it .... In
other words, it deals with what lawyers term the individual's "interest"
in the thing in question .... Governmental action short of acquisition of
title or occupancy has been held if its effects are so complete as to
deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter,
to amount to a taking.1"6
Finally, the Court in United States v. Causby,"6 quoting from United States v.
Cress,117 stated that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of
damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines
the question whether it is a taking."
Each of the foregoing cases, though primarily concerned with the definition
of the term "taking" seem to analyze the term "property" against the backdrop
of a liberal standard of fair dealing. In emphasizing that the constitutional
prohibitions apply to the citizen's right to "possess, use and dispose" of prop-
erty,"18 it is tempting to suggest that the Court is extending constitutional protec-
tion not only to the property itself but also to what might be termed "rights in
relation to property." As stated in one of the treatises:
The rule is that an owner cannot be deprived of any of the essential
attributes which belong to the right of property, and that included
within the right of property which is constitutionally protected are
the right to acquire, hold, enjoy, possess, manage, insure and improve
property and the right to devote property to any legitimate use.119
The enjoyment of property or the ability to put that property to a legitimate use
certainly is greatly diminished if the state can without liability alter or destroy
that property's access at will. Notwithstanding the fact that the abutting owner
may not own the easement of access, his enjoyment of or ability to utilize his
property is dependent upon his right of access. Thus, while the easement of access
may not strictly speaking be a property right, it is arguably a "right in relation
to property" and as such entitled to constitutional protection. Regardless of the
logical possibilities of this analysis as a means of predicting the future course
of Supreme Court decisions in this area, the fact must be recognized that this
"right in relation to property" is at best a crystallization of judicial equity power
114. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
115. Id. at 378.
116. 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
117. 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
118. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). Cf. Griggs v. Alleghany
County, 369 U.S. 84 (.1962) ; Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955, reargument denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963); Note, 49 Cornell L.Q. 116(1963).
119. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 366, at 695 (1963) (Emphasis added.).
See also Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 Hastings
L.J. 135 (1963); Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
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which will be of little or no force or effect unless the Supreme Court elects to
invoke due process as an ultimate prohibition on the exercise of the police power.
Unfortunately, the circumstances under which the Court will apply that pro-
hibition remain unclear.
Sauer v. City of New York, °20 discussed previously, 12 is the only Supreme
Court opinion dealing directly with the constitutionality of a deprivation of
access resulting from state action. In Sauer, claimants argued that both the
contract and due process clauses prohibited the state action. The contract clause
argument was ostensibly rejected because the pattern of ownership of the street
in question precluded the invocation of the protection of that clause. What is
more likely is that the Sauer opinion, insofar as it deals with the contract clause,
is simply an extension of the Court's reluctance, decisively demonstrated in the
previously discussed contract clause cases, to utilize that clause to set aside the
action of a public authority. The due process argument was avoided by the
Court's finding that under the law of New York, no "property right," whether a
fee or an easement, existed in the abutting owner to access in the adjoining street.
It then followed a fortiori that due process was inapplicable. Recent action taken
by the Court indicates its continued unwillingness to squarely face the due process
argument on facts involving an actual or constructive taking.
Both National Biscuit Co. v. State'22 and Northern Lights Shopping Center,
Inc. v. State'23 involved constitutional challeges based upon the due process and
contract clauses to state action resulting in deprivation of access. Petitions for
certiorari were made in both cases and were rejected on each occasion by the
Supreme Court. Similarly, in Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Los Angeles' 24 the
Court dismissed an appeal in a case presenting the question of whether a zoning
ordinance which completely destroyed the economic value of plaintiff's land
amounted to a taking of real property without compensation. It is, of course,
possible that the Court's case load was such that it simply could not hear these
cases. But it is more likely that the Court has elected to maintain its hands-off
position and does not want to become involved in the flood of litigation which
inevitably will result if cases like Sauer are overturned. Given this judicial
"policy" the possibility of the existence of a constitutional right is apparently
insufficient to afford protection to the property owner. Legislative action or con-
120. Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U.S. 536(1907).
121. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
122. 11 N.Y.2d 743, 181 N.E.2d 457, 226 N.Y.S.2d 455, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924
(1962).
123. 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 134, amended, 15 N.Y.2d 960, 207
N.E.2d 521, 259 N.Y.S.2d 849, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965).
124. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962); Note, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 896 (1962). See also Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 16 N.Y.2d
1005, 212 N.E.2d 899, 265 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1965), amended, 17 N.Y.2d 661, 216 N.E.2d 601,
269 N.Y.S.2d 439 (The Court of Appeals stated that it had considered the constitutional
questions and found no denial of appellant's constitutional rights.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
818 (1966).
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stitutional amendment on the state level may afford the only possibility of
redressing this perplexing situation.
IV. REDEFINITION WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FORMULA
FOR COMPENSATION
Given the broad spectrum of constitutional limitation and governmental
power sketched in the previous section and the apparent unwillingness of the
courts to disturb the balance created in the Sauer case and rationalized by the
theory that we have labelled the police power-eminent domain dichotomy, it
would seem to be of some use to briefly focus upon the component parts of the
applicable constitutional provisions. We shall continue with a view to determin-
ing whether the scope of constitutional protection in the access cases can perhaps
be expanded by a redefinition of one or more of these component concepts.
The core concepts of both the federal and state constitutional provisions
include "private property," "taken," "public use," and "just compensation." Of
these four, the third, although helpful in explaining some earlier cases,12 is not
vital to our topic: public use may be assumed in an appropriation or condemna-
tion for highway purposes. 126 Similarly, we need not be concerned with the term
"private," since for our purposes it matters not who is the condemnee. Thus the
problem is narrowed: just compensation is required when property is taken. We
may also assume in this case that just compensation is a factual matter open to
proof in any case which fits the definition to be given "property" and "taken."
The questions therefore become (1) what is meant by "taken," and (2) is there
a "property right" in access to an abutting highway and, if so, what is its scope.
A. Taken
Ordinarily the definition of "taken" has the greatest significance in terms of
the disposition of claims in cases where consequential damages are sought not-
withstanding the absence of any taking of tangible property. The traditionally
accepted definition of "taken" is quite restrictive, and it has been stated
that "acts done in the proper exercise of governmental functions, or pursuant to
valid legislative authority, although they may impair the use or diminish the
value of private proprety, are not generally regarded as a 'taking' by eminent
domain."' 2 7 The classic judicial statement of this view is that of Chief Justice
Gibson for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1843.128 Emphasizing that the
term "taken" as used in the constitutional eminent domain provisions means
exactly what it says as it is commonly used, he explained:
125. See the Elevated Railway Cases, infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.
126. On the topic of additional servitudes caused by non-street or highway use, see
Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1966); Bloomfield & Rochester Nat. Gas-Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N.Y. 386 (1875); Note,
4 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192 (1947).
127. Jahr, Eminent Domain 51, at 73-74 (1953).
128. Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & S. 101 (Pa. 1843).
EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW YORK
And the reason for it is an obvious one. A constitution is made, not
particularly for the inspection of lawyers, but for the inspection of the
million, that they may read and discern in it their rights and their
duties; and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most
familiar to them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote
that they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popular,
obvious, and natural meaning; and, applying this rule to the context of
the Constitution, we have no difficulty in saying that the state is not
bound beyond her will to pay for property which she has not taken to
herself for the public use.129
This explanation has and continues to be one of the clearest statements of what
has been termed the "physical concept" of eminent domain.130
Judicial statements may be found in New York which, if taken at face value,
indicate acceptance of the physical concept. Two of three judges writing in an
1849 case so indicated.' 3 ' One said, "The prohibition of the constitution is against
taking private property without compensation, and not against injuries to such
property, where it is not taken."''  The other refused to equate "injuriously
affected" with "taken."'1 Some cases may be read to require a "physical inva-
sion" of the property.'3 4 Other decisions set less rigid requirements:
[I] t is just as much a taking of property within the spirit of the Con-
stitution to deprive the owner of land of its free use, or to diminish its
value by the construction of an embankment, as it is to enter into phys-
ical possession and occupation therof; and, consequently, upon no other
principle can the provision of the Constitution forbidding the taking
of private property for public purposes without just compensation be
satisfied.' 35
The foregoing quotation is illustrative of the increasingly recognized view
that the strict definition of taking can and will be expanded to cover the so-called
"constructive taking"-i.e., so severe an injury that the landowner is left with
valueless land or land suitable only for sale to adjoining landowners. 13 6 The
"constructive taking" may also be theorized in terms reminiscent of the law of
nuisance, 137 i.e., injuries may be damnum absque injuria until the degree of
inconvenience caused by the public action reaches the plateau of a taking.' 38
129. Id. at 114.
130. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L.J. 221, 224(1931).
131. Drake v. Hudson R. Ry., 7 Barb. 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
132. Id. at 554-56.
133. Id. at 559.
134. Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 162, 31 N.E. 328, 329 (1892);
Huffmire v. City of Brooklyn, 162 N.Y. 584, 591, 57 N.E. 176, 177 (1900); United States
v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958).
135. Rome, W. & O.R.R. v. Gleason, 42 App. Div. 530, 533, 59 N.Y. Supp. 647, 649
(4th Dep't 1899).
136. See generally Sax, supra note 101.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (constant flying of air-
planes over property at low altitude); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (firing of artillery shells over adjacent land).
138. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 Colum. L. Rev.
596, 637 (1942).
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Left open to judicial interpretation is the determination of the "height" of that
plateau in any individual instance.
The theoretical potential of the "constructive taking" concept for expanding
the range of compensable damage in loss of access cases is obvious. The pattern
of decisions in New York, however, appears to limit the utility of this concept.
New York, unfortunately, has applied the "constructive taking" theory only to
cases involving the denial of all access or the landlocking of property. By limiting
the "constructive taking" to these rather infrequent types of cases, the New
York courts have greatly diminished the usefulness of the concept as a mechanism
through which recoveries might be allowed in the great majority of loss of access
cases. The net result is the elimination of the "constructive taking" as a possible
device to bridge the logically sound though economically suspect gap between the
police power "regulation" and eminent domain "taking" dichotomy. It remains
to be seen whether traditionally used concepts of "private property" can or should
be redefined to expand the range of compensable damage to property resulting
from deprivation of access.130
B. Private Property
The discussion of "private property" as it relates to the deprivation of access
cases can readily be subdivided into two interrelated problem areas: (1) whether
there is an easement of access which has reached the level of a property interest
and, if so, what its nature and limitations are, and (2) whether the application
of the "bundle of rights" or other contemporary property theories would make
access such a vital part of the property whole as to be indispensable and com-
pensable as such in eminent domain?
A beginning point for analysis should be consideration of the nature of an
easement in the law of eminent domain. Preliminarily, it should be noted that an
easement is an intangible, an incorporeal hereditament in the inscrutable jargon
of the early common law.140 Fair market value at the time of the appropriation is
the universal compensation standard for complete takings.141 But like most ease-
ments, the easements in the situation here presented have no fair market value
because they have no value at all to any but one individual-the abutting owner.
They die a natural death when divorced from the dominant tenement. Therefore,
they must be valued by viewing the dominant tenement before appropriation, as
enhanced by the easements, and after appropriation, divorced from the ease-
ments.142 This valuation process then becomes remotely similar to a unity of use
problem.143 A severance damage is allowed to one piece of property for the taking
139. It is the view of Cormack, supra note 130, at 247, that the answer to the overly
rigid taking concept is best avoided by a flexible definition of property.
140. 1 Thompson, Real Property 23 (1964); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions 29-30 (1923).
141. Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
142. Bohm v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry., 129 N.Y. 576, 585, 587-88 29 N.E. 802,
804-05 (1892).
143. See Rezzolla, Unity of Use and Unity of Ownership in Eminent Domain, 70 Dick.
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of another which was used in conjunction with it and increased its value. Because
the easements have no separate market value, direct damages are nominal.
144
The true damage is consequential to the tangible property, and should be so
viewed.14 r'
1. The Genesis of the Property Right
A good many law review articlesland student notes briefly trace the history
of the supposed easements of light, air, access, and view.'46 Each returns to the
series of New York Court of Appeals cases known as the Elevated Railway cases
as the true genesis of the "property right."' 47 The Elevated Railway cases all
L. Rev. 139 (1966); County of Erie v. Lafayette Hotel, 16 A.D.2d 866, 228 N.Y.S.2d 783
(4th Dep't 1962); 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 14.31(1) (3d ed. 1950).
144. Matter of City of New York (Exterior St.), 285 N.Y. 455, 35 N.E.2d 39 (1941).
145. Consequential damages absent some direct damage ordinarily cannot be recovered.
Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor, 4 N.Y. 195 (1850). Judge Peckham in Bohm v. Metroplitan Elev.
Ry., 129 N.Y. 576, 587, 29 N.E. 802, 805 (1892), explains the theory of creation of a prop-
erty right in access as follows: "By this mode of reasoning, the difficulty of regarding the
whole damage done to the adjacent owner as consequential only (because none of his prop-
erty was taken), and, therefore, not collectible from the defendants, was overcome." For dis-
cussions of the problems which arose when the elevated railways were themselves condemned
see Notes, 40 Yale L.J. 779, 1074, 1309 (1931).
146. See, e.g., Clarke, The Limited-Access Highway, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111 (1952);
Covey, Control of Highway Access, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 407 (1959); Covey, Frontage Roads:
To Compensate or Not To Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 587 (1961); Duhaime, Limited
Access to Highways, 33 Ore. L. Rev. 16 (1953); Gibbes, Control of Highway Access-Its
Prospects and Problems, 12 S.C.L.Q. 377 (1960); Knowles, Loss of Access: A Twentieth
Century Enigma, 6 St. Louis U.L.J. 204 (1960).
147. Some refer to Matter of Lewis-Street, 2 Wend. 472 (N.Y. 1829). In
Lewis-Street, Chief Justice Savage faced the difficulty of fixing compensation to the fee
owner of the street bed upon extension of the street. The owner had previously sold lots
abutting the street, retaining only the street itself. Compensation was sought from the abutting
owners on the recognized principle that they benefited most directly from the public im-
provement. The Court recognized, however, that a premium had already been paid the street
owner for the privilege of owning street-abutting lands and commented that:
The court are therefore of opinion that when a building lot is sold, bounded on a
street in the city of New York, designated as such upon the map of the city, or on
a map made by the owner of lands in reference to which sales are made, although
the street remains at the time unopened under the authority of the corporation, a
covenant may well be implied that the purchaser shall have an easement or right of
way in the street to the full extent of its dimensions, and that when the same is
subsequently opened, on the application of the corporation, the purchaser is not
liable to pay the owner for the value of the land thus appropriated, but only for the
fee subject to the easement. [ld. at 475J.
Abutting owners were also said in an 1839 Kentucky case to have a "peculiar interest" in
a street different from that of the public in general which achieves the status of an incorporeal
hereditament. Lexington & O.R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 294 (1839). See also
Rowan's Ex'rs v. Town of Portland, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 232 (1848); Lackland v. North
Missouri R.R., 31 Mo. 180, 187-88 (1860). In addition, it is possible to find change of grade
cases, among the purest of access-loss problems, in the British common law as early as the
eighteenth century. Damages for the change were allowed in Leader v. Moxon, 3 Wils. K.B.
461, 95 Eng. Rep. 1157 (1773). Whatever one's opinion on the advisability of allowing such
damages, the court in Leader gave no indication that serious consideration was given the
problem. The case was subsequently discussed and overruled in Governor & Co. of the
Brit. Cast Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith, 4 T.R. 794, 100 Eng. Rep. 1306 (K.B. 1797). The argu-
ments of the members of the court demonstrated remarkable foresight.
If this action could be maintained, every turnpike act, paving act, and navigation-
act, would give rise to an infinity of actions. If the Legislature think it necessary,
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involved somewhat similar facts, the differences being found in the wording of
conveyances and the identity of parties thereto. The basic similarity in facts is
that each of the Elevated Railway cases involved the use of the center area of a
public street in New York City for construction of a railway viaduct by or for a
private company. Although theoretical arguments may be made on each side, the
proposed use was considered by the courts to be private rather than public.
The first of the cases is Story v. New York Elev. R.R.148 in which the mag-
nitude of the problem faced might be best expressed by the fact that the two
majority opinions total thirty-eight pages, to which must be added the dissenting
opinions of three of the seven judges. The case may be easier than others because
in it the predecessors of the abutting owners purchased from the city itself. While
the fee to the street was in the city, the deed declared that the street "shall for-
ever thereafter continue and be for the free and common passage, and as public
streets and ways, for the inhabitants and all others .... 149 On the basis of
this language, the Court found that a trust was created restricting any actions of
the city which might diminish or obstruct the street use by the abutting owner.
Holding for the claimant, Judge Danforth, in the first majority opinion, charac-
terized the right of access acquired by the abutting owner as a "perpetual en-
cumbrance upon the land burdened with it. From the moment it attached, the
lot became the dominant, and the open way or street the servient tenement." 0
Observing that the value of the lot was enhanced by its frontage on the street,
Judge Danforth further noted that "it is to be presumed that the grantee paid,
and the grantor received an enlarged price by reason of this added value. There
was thus secured to the plaintiff the right and privilege of having the street
forever kept open as such." '151 Of particular interest in this statement is the
argument that the grantor had already once been paid for the added benefit of
street frontage.15 2 This language may suggest that Story was simply a case in
which an estoppel was applied.
as they do in many cases, they enable the commissioner to award satisfaction to
the individuals who happen to suffer. But if there be no such power, the parties are
without remedy, provided the commisioners do not exceed their jurisdiction. But it
does not seem to me that the commissioners acting under this act have been guilty
of any excess of jurisdiction. Some individuals suffer an inconvenience under all these
acts of parliament; but the interests of individuals must give way to the accommoda-
tions of the public. [Id. at 796, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1307 (Lord Kenyon, Ch.J.)]
There are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury, for which the law
gives no action; for instance, pulling down houses, or raising bulwarks, for the
preservation and defence of the kingdom against the king's enemies. The civil law
writers indeed say, that the individuals who suffer have a right to resort to the
public for a satisfaction: but no one ever thought that the common law gave an
action against the individual who pulled down the house, &c. This is one of those
cases to which the maxim applies, salus populi suprema est lex. [Id. at 797, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 1307-08 (Buller, J.)]
148. 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
149. Id. at 144.
150. Id. at 145.
151. Id. at 144-45.
152. The same argument was made fifty years earlier in Matter of Lewis-Street, 2 Wend.
472 (N.Y. 1829).
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It is difficult to cull from the majority opinions in Story the precise limits of
the easement of access, if in fact such an easement existed. Judge Danforth
emphasized that the basis of the easement was to have the street kept open so
that light, air, and access would be available to the abutting lot. Only surface
street uses predominated over the abutter's interest: any use of the street above
the surface could not lawfully obstruct "the access or light and air, to the
detriment of the abutting owner. . . . To hold otherwise," admonished Judge
Danforth, "would enable the city to derogate from its own grant, and violate the
arrangement on the faith of which the lot was purchased."'153 Judge Tracy, on
the other hand, limited the question to whether private property was taken for
public use in the constitutional sense. He stated:
As we have seen, the plaintiff acquired nothing more than a right to have
the street kept as a public street, and this must be deemed to be held
subject to the power of the legislature to regulate and control the public
use of the street. 54
Conceding that this trust is for the benefit of the abutting owner, as well
as for the public, the only right which he has in the street is the right to
insist that the trust be faithfully executed. So long as the street is kept
open as a public street, the abutting owner cannot complain. 55
Though the majority opinions are not the picture of clarity, it seems fair to
say that the predominant concern of the Judges in Story was with the trust theory
and, in addition, with estoppel considerations, rather than with a property right
in the easement of access. The question then becomes how much further, if at all,
did the later Elevated Railway cases go in declaring an easement of general
existence.
Lahr v. Metropolitan R.R. 56 was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1887.
It is easy to read the Story case to apply only to the situation in which an express
trust may be found to have been assumed to keep the street open for street pur-
poses. Chief Judge Ruger considered Lahr to be a sequel to Story and considered
that case to be determinative of most of the issues. Lathr differed only insofar as
the title of the plaintiff had been derived differently, and no deed language
guaranteed continuance of a public street. However, the statute which authorized
the original taking promised that the property would be held "in trust.., and
kept open for or as part of a public street ... forever .... ,,-57 Thus, insofar as
compensation was based upon a trust theory, the result conformed to that in
Story. The Court's adherence to the trust theory is vividly demonstrated by the
lengths to which it went to find the trust in the later case of Kane v. New
York Elev. R.R. 5 8 In Kane the trust was found in the general scheme of city
153. 90 N.Y. at 145-46.
154. Id. at 168.
155. Id. at 172.
156. 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887).
157. Id. at 289, 10 N.E. at 532.
158. 125 N.Y. 164,26 N.E. 278 (1891).
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charters and legislation notwithstanding that the fee in the street had vested in
the government during the period when New York was a Dutch colony.
A very critical distinction was being made throughout the twenty-five years
following Story,159 a period which witnessed great changes in metropolitan
transportation systems. Fobes v. Rome, W. & 0. R.R.60  considered the following
problem: If an elevated railway now caused compensable damage to abutting
owners, what effect did this have upon the accepted rule that a railway at street
surface level did not? The Court in Fobes found no violation of the trust, the
surface railway being a street purpose, with compensation to abutters therefore
not being required. On this point it is appropriate to compare Reining v. New
York, L. & W. Ry. 161 with Talbot v. New York & H.R.R.1 12 The former in-
volved a viaduct to be used primarily for a street railway, and compensation was
allowed. The latter disallowed compensation in the case of an elevated street
bridge. The theoretical distinction forming the basis for these and other cases
was that stressed by Judge Tracy in Story: that the gist of the trust was that the
property be used for street purposes and an elevated railway was not such.
The case of Sauer v. City of New York, 1 3 discussed previously in regard
to constitutional limitations, put the entire problem to rest in an interesting man-
ner. In Sauer, a street viaduct was constructed similar to the railway viaducts in
the Elevated Railway cases. The use of the viaduct for railways was expressly
prohibited. Applying the principles stated in Story and its progeny, the Court of
Appeals found the proposed construction a "street use" designed to improve public
travel. The abutter's title was found to be subject to such uses and compensation
was therefore denied. The decision of the United States Supreme Court includes
the statement that within the meaning of the applicable New York law no ease-
ment existed to protect injury to light, air and access for a public or street
purpose. Therefore, it followed a fortiori that there was no property and con-
sequently no taking. This rule has been uniformly followed in New York since
Sauer.
The question might now be asked whether the creation of the so-called
"Cproperty interest" in the easement of access was necessary to the disposition of
the Elevated Railway cases. In Story and Lahr it was not. The covenants there
could have been enforced without giving them new names. In any situation where
the rdadbed is taken from the abutter for highway uses whether in fee or by
taking an easement only, a covenant to apply it to street purposes only could be
implied much as it was in Kane v. New York Elev. R.R.10 4 This type of analysis
159. The easement of access history includes a refusal of the United States Supreme
Court to allow a retreat from the rule in an elevated railway case on the ground that prop-
erty owners had justifiably relied on the established rule to their detriment. Muhlker v.
N.Y. & H.R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), reversing, 173 N.Y. 549, 66 N.E. 588 (1903).
160. 121 N.Y. 505, 24 N.E. 919 (1890).
161. 128 N.Y. 157, 28 N.E. 640 (1891).
162. 151 N.Y. 155, 45 N.E. 382 (1896).
163. 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
164. 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891).
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makes unnecessary the creation of an "easement." This is especially true where
only a highway easement is taken. Any non-highway use thus imposes upon the
fee an additional servitude for which additional compensation must be paid.16 5
This conclusion follows from the assumption expressed in some cases that the
initial compensation paid when the land was first put to use as a street remained
adequate to cover subsequent use for any and all street purposes, but only those
purposes. 160 If it is assumed, as itdeed it must be, that the condemnor will
develop the land taken to the highest degree possible within the purposes of the
taking, 67 any street use or public use must therefore be covered by the original
compensation claim.
Although subsequently expressly limited, Story and Lahr somehow in the
eyes of many still stand for the abstract proposition that the abutting property
owner has an actual property interest called an easement of light, air and access.
The fact of the matter is that the so-called "property interest" in the easement of
access was nothing more than a creation of judicial fiat for use as an equity
balancing device and was recognized as such by the Court of Appeals in Bohm v.
Metropolitan Elev. R.R. 68 The grade of a roadway may be raised or lowered,
the highway may be moved, closed, or access to it may be denied, and all without
directly damaging any property interest of the abutting owner. It is only where
the public denies all access that there is a taking for public purposes, and that
is a taking of the abutting land and not of an easement of light, air and access.
Generally applied principles of real property law do nothing to detract from this
analysis and, in fact, support these conclusions.
2. Contemporary Property Concepts
The easement of light, air and access, while not conceptually unusual, is not
what it would seem to be from its title. The title indicates possibly an affirmative
easement. In fact, it is one of a far more limited and limitable nature-it is a
negative 69 or negative equitable easement. °7 In the situation in which an af-
firmative easement allowed access across a given piece of. property, the right
would not seem to depend upon the identity of the persons challenging or infring-
ing upon it. The negative easement is in fact merely a veto power for the benefit
of the dominant tenement.171 Enforcement of the easement allows the owner to
165. Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966).
166. Id. at 364, 218 N.E.2d at 269, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
167. Moody, Condemnation of Land for Highway or Expressway, 33 Texas L. Rev.
357, 358 (1954).
168. 129 N.Y. 576, 585-88, 29 N.E. 802, 804-05 (1892).
169. 3 Powell, Real Property lffl 404, 405 (1966); Restatement, Property §§ 451-52
(1944).
170. 2 Thompson, Real Property § 382 (1961); Restatement, Property § 452 (1944).
171. An unsuccessful example of an attempt to create a negative easement by appropria-
tion may be seen in Shulman v. People, 10 N.Y.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 817, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241
(1961) (attempt to prohibit roadside advertising without specific enabling legislation). For
comments on the topic of acquisition of roadside development restriction rights see Netherton,
Control of Highway Access 266-70 (1963).
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prohibit certain uses of the servient tenement which would injure the dominant
tenement. In the situation here presented, the easement is implied from the total-
ity of circumstances to allow vetoing of, or compensation for, non-street or
highway uses only. This easement looks much more like a restrictive covenant
than the commonly recognized easement. Indeed, this type of interest is treated
by Judge Clark in his classic work under the heading equitable restrictions. 1 72
It is suggested by one writer that access cannot be considered property in
and of itself, but should be thought of as only one of a "bundle of rights," the
totality of which constitutes property.173 The idea of property as a complex of
rights is interesting, and has been discussed often and in some depth in the past
half century.174 However, it is difficult to see how this categorization or new
semantic framework aids in the analysis of the problem. It does not help us to
determine against whom the right is enforceable, nor does it in any way diminish
the logical force of the police power-eminent domain dichotomy as the accepted
rule for decision in deprivation of access cases. Moreover, it fails completely to
put relative values upon each or any of the rights in the bundle. All of the rights
in the bundle cannot be of equal value. The right of access, if such exists, may
in certain situations have a value substantially equal to the entire value of the
real property-as in the landlocking cases.
Brief mention should also be made of a related concept previously discussed
in relation to constitutional limitations, i.e., the "right in relation to property.' 17
It would seem that categorizing this "right" in terms of what has traditionally
been recognized as "property," insofar as the easement of access is concerned, is
simply not possible in New York, especially in light of the general thrust to the
contrary of the Elevated Railway cases. This so-called "right in relation to
property" would seem to be a judicial recognition, thus far neither adopted nor
disapproved in New York that the actual ownership of property carries with it
incidental rights without precedent in the law of property which in some instances
are so basic as to be assumed by the property owner. Under these circumstances,
the "right" in all probability is simply a judicial device for redressing economic
inequities in situations where relief would otherwise be inappropriate under
settled authority.176 As provocative as this concept may be in relation to the
previously discussed constitutional limitations, there is no question that the
judicial recognition of this concept has been at best spotty. The basic problem
remains, therefore, how to initiate a change in the present pattern of decision on
some uniform and rational basis.
172. Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With Land, ch. 6. (2d ed. 1947).
173. Note, 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 310, 315-16; see also Cormack, supra note 130, at 238-39.
174. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 29-30 (1923); 1 Powell, Real Property
1111 7, 96 (1949) ; 1 Thompson, Real Property § 1 (1964).
175. Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. Ry., 51 N.H. 504 (1871).
176. Of course, any court sufficiently innovative to create a property right as suggested
by Judge Peckham in Bobm v. Metropolitan Elev. R.R., 129 N.Y. 576, 587, 29 N.E. 802, 805
(1892), should already have been able to give birth to a mere "right in relation to property."
For a discussion on the "right in relation to property" see 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 366, at 695-96 and cases collected (1963).
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Regardless of one's predisposition for or against the so-called property
interest in the easement of access, there does not appear to be any real argument
that, notwithstanding the isolated dicta in Story and Lahr, the Elevated Railway
cases, viewed as a whole, did not represent any new departures in compensation
for loss of access based upon any real or imagined property interest in the ease-
ment of access. The theoretical possibilities of the "bundle of rights" approach to
property or the "right in relation to property" as a new conceptual framework
within which to clearly define a new property interest or expand the scope of
the term "property" to include the easement of access must remain only a
possibility in light of the uniform pattern of decisions in New York either reject-
ing or simply ignoring these notions. The conclusion seems inescapable that
redressing the economic inequities of the loss of access decisions cannot be ac-
complished from within the judicial framework. The logically consistent con-
stitutional balance struck between police power "regulation" and eminent domain
"taking" has become the prevailing rule of decision in the vast majority of
loss of access cases. The unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to
disturb this balance is amply demonstrated by the numerous refusals by that
Court to directly consider the question via the writ of certiorari. 177 In addition,
the impossibility of expanding the range of compensable access losses through a
redefinition of any or all of the component parts of the constitutional formula
for recovery has been demonstrated above. It becomes abundantly clear that if
there is to be a change, it must take the form of a new rule of decision imposed
via institutions or instrumentalities outside of the judiciary.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
If compensation for interference with access is an end to be achieved, as
we believe it is, one cannot look for an answer in the decisional law. All of the
above conclusively shows that decisional law in New York consistently denies
recovery. It is also beyond question now, we think, that there is no rational
justification for an argument that compensation should be allowed based upon
common law property concepts or interpretation of what constitutes a taking.
In other words, notwithstanding the resultant inequities, we agree at least con-
ceptually with the New York courts and their interpretations. The answer must
be sought in the form of constitutional or statutory enactment.
A. Constitutional Amendment
Prior to 1870 purely consequential damages were universally held to be
damnum absque injuria.178 In that year, Illinois enacted the first constitutional
provision requiring compensation for taking or damaging private property as
opposed to the usual taking provision. Since that time thirty states have changed
177. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
178. Stubbs, Access Rights of an Abutting Landowner, 1963 Institute On Eminent
Domain 59, 61.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
their constitutions accordingly. 179 The spectrum of constitutional eminent do-
main language now ranges from none at all in North Carolina, where compensa-
tion is based upon natural justice theories, °80 to states in which municipalities or
the state itself must compensate where property is "taken, injured or de-
stroyed."'-8
The commentators have reached divergent conclusions in totaling the exact
number of states which now have "taken or damaged" provisions.' 8 2 This is
probably due in part to different classifications of those constitutions which do
not conform exactly to either "taken" or "taken or damaged" terminology. The
principal text on the subject guesses that these hybrid and variant forms do
not differ in substance from the more common terminology.' 8 3 States such as
Alabama may also cause difficulties, since the state is liable only for a taking
while municipalities face broader liability.'8 4 There are eighteen states whose
constitutions require compensation only for takings.'85 Twenty allow recovery
for taking or damaging.' 80 Seven compensate where property is "taken or applied
to public use(s),"187 The remaining five are unusual situations, including North
Carolina and Kansas, the latter providing in the corporations article of its con-
stitution for compensation for property "appropriated to the use of any corpora-
tion."' 88 Arkansas and Minnesota improved upon Illinois with "taken, ap-
propriated or damaged," 8 9 and "taken, destroyed or damaged"' 9 0 respectively.
Texas lumped everything together, demanding allowance of damages where
property is "taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use."19 ' Of
some significance is the fact that of the thirty-seven states which have substan-
tially reviewed and revised their constitutions since 1870, only eight have re-
tained the taking provision.
In construing the 1870 Illinois constitutional change, state and federal
179. See generally the tabulation in Cromwell, Loss of Access to Highways: Different
Approaches to the Problem of Compensation, 48 Va. L. Rev. 538, 548-54 (1962).
180. Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48
Va. L. Rev. 437, 441 (1962), citing Shute v. City of Monroe, 187 N.C. 676, 683, 123 S.E.
71, 74 (1924).
181. Ala. Const. art. 2, § 235; Ky. Const. § 242; Pa. Const. art. 16, § 8. These sections
apply against municipalities but not against the states. See discussion in Note; 18
Ala. L. Rev. 315, 316-17 (1966). See generally Bishop, Non-Compensable Damages it
Eminent Domain Proceedings, 19 Ala. Law. 172 (1958).
182. Spies & McCoid, supra note 180, at 446 (23 states) ; Stubbs, supra note 178, at
88 (31 states) ; Note, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 256, 260 n.36 (1947) (26 states at that time).
183. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.44 n.1 (3d ed. 1950).
184. Bishop, supra note 181, at 173; Note, 18 Ala. L. Rev. 315, 318-19 (1966), dis-
cussing Ala. Const. art. 1, § 23; art. 2, § 235.
185. Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont
and Wisconsin. The possibility of error in our tabulation is not to be discounted.
186. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
187. Alabama, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
188. Kan. Const. art. 12, § 4.
189. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 22.
190. Minn. Const. art. 1, § 13.
191. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 17.
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courts could not determine anything other than that the addition of the words
"or damaged" was intended to change existing law. The existing law was that
purely consequential damage inflicted by government edict gave no claim for
damages-i.e., only a physical invasion of property brought the constitutional
mandate into play. The Illinois Supreme Court in Rigney v. City of Chicago92
recognized that the change intended by the amendment was to compel payment
for consequential damages. The holding of Rigney was specifically applied to
the loss of access problem in City of Chicago v. Union Bldg. Ass'n.193 On the
basis of the new constitutional provision, the court held that,
property holders bordering upon streets have, as an incident to their
ownership of such property, a right of access by way of the streets,
which can not be taken away or materially impaired by the city without
incurring legal liability .... But in no other respect do the property
owners or citizens of the municipality have a right in the street other
or different than that of the public generally.' 94
Brief study of the background of the 1870 Illinois revision, demonstrates con-
clusively that the amendment was, as stated in the Union Bldg. case, devised
(or viewed by the courts to have been devised) primarily to remove inequities in
the area of access restrictions. Significantly, the United States Supreme Court
accepted the Illinois construction of the new language in the 1888 case of
Chicago v. Taylor.195
It is obvious that wherever the "taken or damaged" formulation has been
accepted the result should have been to allow damages in more cases than would
have been possible under a "taken" form of constitutional provision. It is equally
true that to construe the new language literally would have led to unwarranted
results by way of the totally irresponsible expansion of the categories of com-
pensable damage.'9 6 Although advocates may be found for a construction allowing
broad risk distribution, 197 even that view is tempered to require a showing of a
clearly demonstrable pecuniary loss proximately caused by the acts of the
sovereign. 198 Recognition must be and is given to the already fantastic costs of
condemnation even without an additional expansion of public liability. Whether
this results from the sheer volume of land taken, the possibility that the best
land is often taken, or factors such as the recognized phenomenon that the best
use of much land is for public appropriation, need not be considered here.
The accepted limitation upon recovery under an "or damaged" provision is
192. 102 Il1. 64 (1881).
193. 102 Ill. 379 (1882).
194. Id. at 397.
195. 125 U.S. 161 (1888).
196. See Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Donain, 42 Colum. L. Rev.
596, 610-12 (1942).
197. See, e.g., Spies & McCoid, supra note 180, at 449-55; Cormack, supra note 173, at
224; Note, 12 Albany L.J. 53, 54 (1875).
198. Spies & McCoid, supra note 180, at 455. This is not to suggest that damage to
access is not clearly demonstrable, but other types of purely consequential damage may be
highly speculative.
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that the damage must accure to the property owner specifically 10 -that it must
differ in kind and degree from that suffered by the public in general.20 0 And, of
course, remote and highly speculative damages are still denied.20 1 One cannot
proceed far beyond the general without encountering difficulties. The "or
damaged" wording has not been a cure-all for the ills seen by some in condemna-
tion compensation practice. It would of course be desirable to be able to say
that "taking" and "taking and damaging" provisions achieve similar results in
all cases of listed types and dissimilar results in all cases of other listed types.
However, the jurisdictions involved are far too numerous to even hope for such a
lucky coincidence. A survey of very few modern cases dispels any feeling that
the newer formula is a panacea 02
A recent student note collects law on recovery for the creation of a cul-de-sac
by cutting off a street some distance from the claimant's land.2 0 3 The ultimate
question is whether there is a private right of travel in both directions from
abutting land. The cases collected show fourteen courts allowing recovery and
twenty-three disallowing it. Of the jurisdictions which have, since 1955, reviewed
their stands or taken them for the first time, the count was eleven to six against
recovery. Of the seventeen recent decisions, twelve were in states having pure
"taking" or pure "taking or damaging" provisions absent extraneous phrases or
words. Of the "taking" states, two allowed recovery and two denied it. Six
"taking or damaging" states denied compensation and two allowed it.
Arizona is a "taken or damaged" state,2 0 4 while Arkansas has gone a bit
farther to cover property "taken, appropriated, or damaged."20 5 In April, 1960,
the highest courts of both states decided circuity of access cases involving some-
what similar facts. In each case claimant owned commercial highway-abutting
property. In each case the state chose to appropriate a strip of the claimant's
property in order to redesign the highway as limited access and provide other
abutting owners with a frontage. In State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg,0 0 de-
cided by the Arizona Supreme Court, access to defendants' motel after con-
demnation could be had via the service road, which in turn could be reached
from the main highway at points 170 feet to the west and one mile east of the
motel. The defendants in State Highway Comm'&n v. Binghan,0 7 the Arkansas
199. Lenhoff, supra note 196, at 613.
200. See, e.g., 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 14.24 (3d ed. 1950).
201. Id. at § 14.241 passim.
202. Of course, consistency is not even found in the remaining "taken" jursidictions. An
example is found in change of grade. The New York rule is clear: absent statute, no re-
covery. Michigan is also a "taken" state, retaining this formulation through the latest major
constitutional revision in 1963, Mich. Const. art. 10, § 2. Contrary to the New York "com-
mon law" position, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Thorn v. State, 376 Mich. 608, 135
N.W.2d 322 (1965), that a change of grade is a taking, and compensation is therefore
required.
203. Note, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 850 (1966).
204. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17.
205. Ark. Const. art 2, § 22.
206. 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960). See also Stubbs, Compensable and Noncompen-
sable Items in Condemnation, 1967 Institute On Eminent Domain 137-160.
207. 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728 (1960).
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case, were the owner and lessee of a gasoline station. The nearest access to the
service road from the through road was over a mile from the premises. The
Arizona court allowed damages for diversion of traffic; the Arkansas court did
not. New York, despite its different constitutional provision, would agree with
Arkansas.2 08
Regardless of these apparent inconsistencies, it can be stated generally that
the newer terminology agrees with the old wherever compensation was allowed,
and extends coverage of the right to compensation through almost all limitations
of access. Obviously, all jurisdictions have not limited the range of compensable
damage identically. But this is a problem of judicial construction facing each
court, and the responsibility for the answers devised must be placed with the
courts, not the constitutional wording.
The problem inherent in any fundamental constitutional change is that a
complete body of law, developed over many decades, must be re-examined and
possibly discarded. That some inequities presently exist is beyond question. But
predictability is considered a virtue of some value. If it could be unequivocally
stated that a change in terminology would affect the result in only those cases in
which inequities are seen by the draftsman, then this is a predictability all its
own. But this cannot be said of a change as fundamental as that made by Illinois
in 1870 and many other states since. "Or damaged" could cover many problems
beyond limitation of access, and certainly does not contain an express limita-
tion of application even in the access area-as illustrated by the cul-de-sac cases.
Regardless of the difficulties the very pervasiveness of the problem and the ob-
vious inequities of present judicial interpretation may compel the utilization of
the mechanism of constitutional amendment as the only vehicle through which
the problem areas in loss of access cases, and indeed, other problem areas in the
law of eminent domain, can be reconsidered and hopefully eliminated by the
courts. The doctrine of stare decisis effectively prevents the judiciary from tak-
ing the initiative in redefining the limits of compensation in the loss of access
cases. 0 9 Each case in this chain of authority, standing alone, might be said to
have presented the deciding court with a choice between the speedy completion
of admittedly important public highway improvements or slowing the pace of
highway expansion and improvement in order to redress what could easily have
appeared (on a single case basis) to be an isolated economic injustice to the
victimized abutting owner. But viewing this body as an organic whole, one is
confronted with a massive chronicle of injustice to property owners, albeit for the
purpose of improving the sinews of public transportation. The fact is that these
208. See, e.g., Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 227 N.E.2d 37, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1967);
Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 A.D.2d 747, 253 N.Y.S.2d 713 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16
N.Y.S.2d 1005, 212 N.E.2d 899, 265 N.Y.2d 664 (1965), amended, 17 N.Y.2d 661, 216
NYE.2d 601, 269 N.Y.S.2d 439, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 818 (1966).
209. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334 (1944); Sprecher, The
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied,
31 A.B.A.J. 501 (1945); Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 Cornell L.Q. 137 (1946); Douglas,
Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949).
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public and private ends are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The probable
catalytic force of the constitutional amendment as providing the impetus neces-
sary to overcome this judicial impasse must in and of itself be viewed as a
desirable result. Once the stumbling blocks to re-evaluation of the access cases
have been thus removed, the resolution of the admittedly perplexing question of
the scope and interpretation of the new amendment should be left where it
rightly belongs, with the judiciary.
B. Statutory Change
Other routes than changing to a "taking or damaging" constitutional pro-
vision are available. In New York one which many might accept is the enactment
of a constitutional provision specifically allowing compensation for limitation
of access as a result of a public improvement. This is, of course, the basic
reason why New York has a constitution the size of a dictionary, and the reason
why constitutional revision by convention is necessary at approximately thirty
year intervals. Such specificity is better left to statute, the alternative which we
now consider as a possible solution to the access problem.
While a statute denying compensation for the taking of property by eminent
domain would be unconstitutional, obviously, money damages may be awarded
by statute in cases where not so mandated by the constitution.210 Iowa, a
"taking" state,2-1 allows compensation by statute for damages to right of ingress
or egress or deprivation of light, air or view occasioned by street construction
whether a change of grade occurs or not.2 1 2 California, one of the "taking or
damaging" jurisdictions 2 1 3 has enacted a change of grade compensation
statute.2 14 New York Highway Law section 197 requires compensation for
damages resulting from change of highway grade in any town.2 -1 Section 54-a
of the same law mandates reconstruction of damaged access in certain instances
where caused by changes in road level in the state highway system. An example
of other constitutionally unrequired damage provisions is found in New York
Laws 1916, ch. 576, an amendment to the Buffalo Grade Crossing Elimination
Act. Section 12 of the act allows compensation for creation of a cul-de-sac to an
owner of property abutting a street between the point of closing and the inter-
section of the nearest public thoroughfare.
A statutory system of compensation for changes in highway grade was
advocated at least as early as 1875.216 A great number of New York cases make
it abundantly clear that there can be no recovery absent such a statute2 1 7 The
forms possible for any such statutory system are many in number, thus sug-
210. Cf. Comment, 63 Dick. L. Rev. 163 (1958).
211. Iowa Const. art. 1, § 18.
212. Iowa Code § 389.29 (1962).
213. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 14.
214. Calif. Sts. & H'ways Code §§ 8000-62 (1956).
215. See also N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 99; N.Y. Village Law § 159.
216. Note, 12 Albany L.. 53 (1875).
217. See cases cited in Note, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 242 (1939).
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gesting a flexibility not available in constitutional change. Highway Law section
197 is the rather simple system chosen by New York in the change of grade situa-
tion. Almost all of the other types of access impairment cases could, at least in
theory, be lumped into a single almost equally simple statute. There is, however,
one serious drawback to statutory change which becomes apparent upon con-
sideration of New York's previous statutory experience in this area. Each of the
statutes and municipal ordinances and charters analyzed in the survey of the law
set forth at the beginning of this article included the limiting provision that the
statute was not intended to create any new liability not already existing at com-
mon law. The cases demonstrate that this provision effectively, and perhaps
purposefully, restricts the range of application of the particular statute. Regard-
less of the reason for this restrictive policy, whether rooted in the ambiguity of
the statutes or what might be called the negative conditioning of the judiciary in
the common law cases, it must, for purposes of assessing the future utility of
statutes in this area, be recognized that the New York judiciary has consistently
refused to expand the range of compensable damage under statute in deprivation
of access cases. This, in addition to what some of the commentators designate
as a general judicial tendency to strictly construe any statute creating or limiting
a right in derogation of the common law,218 makes it likely that any statutory
change in favor of increased compensation will be far too strictly construed to
accomplish the intended purpose. The simplicity of the language contemplated
for constitutional amendment, the general applicability of the constitutional
provision, and the superiority of constitutional amendment in terms of the
judicial recognition of it as the fundamental law of the state rather than as a
single legislative act in derogation of the common law, in addition to the short-
comings of legislative change pointed out above, combine to suggest the potential
superiority of constitutional amendment as the vehicle for change in this area.
Finally, and most importantly, regardless of variations in interpretation, it has
been the uniform experience of other states adopting the "taking or damaging"
provision that such an amendment has effectively overcome judicial intransigence
to change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most forceful method of demonstrating the desirability of a
redefinition or change in the law as it relates to compensation for deprivation of
access is to consider the shortcomings of the policy arguments advanced to sup-
port the present status of the law. The arguments against allowing compensation
appear to reduce to just three: (1) The abutter is on notice when he purchases
218. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 9-10 (1928); Landis, A Note On Statu-
tory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930); Thorne, The Equity of a Statute, 31 IIl.
L. Rev. 202, 214-15, 217 (1936); Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 Can. B.
Rev. 1, 17-18 (1938) ; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on Reading Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527 (1947) ; Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 438, 439, 447-48 (1950).
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his property that the road may in the future be removed or replaced;210 (2)
The sovereign is in the same position as any other neighbor who possesses the
absolute privilege to remove his improvement, i.e., the streets, which may be
highly beneficial to his neighbor's property; 20 and (3) The courts must recog-
nize the practical difficulties borne by the sovereign in paying the cost of im-
provements, and balance the interest of the abutter and the public in favor of
the public.221
The first argument makes little or no sense. We have not heard of or read
the opinion of any appraiser who discounts the value of highway abutting prop-
erty by the percentage probability that in the future it will no longer abut.222 In
all likelihood, the probability is incalculable. Mr. Justice Holmes recognized a
"practical expectation of continued access," 223 but rebelled at elevating it to
the status of a right. This "practical expectation must be considered, and has
been since some of the earliest comments on the subject. Most men lack the
ability to accurately predict the future and, because of this failing, drop the
remotest of possibilities from their thinking altogether. Loss of access usually
falls into the category of extremely remote possibilities, and does not enter into
the formulation of the market price for the particular piece of abutting property.
Moreover, even if loss of access were contemplated, that contemplation is ir-
relevant. No man is prevented from purchasing land known to be subject to con-
demnation at some time in the future. To prevent denying the seller full market
value, which he would recover if the land were appropriated from him, the future
condemnation is not given great consideration. That loss of access is contemplated
is no reason for disallowing compensation for the loss, any more than compensation
should be denied simply because a purchaser knows of an impending appropria-
tion of tangible property. The inequity of applying this risk is heightened when
we ask the abutter to not only expect the loss of his property but also to very
accurately adjust his purchase price to allow for amortization at the time of the
taking224 -a time completely within the knowledge and control of the sovereign.
The reasoning behind the second argument-that the sovereign is like any
other neighbor-neglects to consider the special relationship between the citizen-
abutting owner of property and his government. That this relationship is com-
219. Note, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 202, 205 (1959), citing Paul v. Carver, 24 Pa. 207
(1855). But see Note, 12 Albany L.J. 53, 54-55 (1875).
220. Bishop, supra note 181, at 178; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J.
36, 74-75 (1964).
221. Duhaime, Limiting Access to Highways, 33 Ore. L. Rev. 16, 40 (1953).
222. See, e.g., Schmutz, Condemnation Appraisal Handbook, chs. 11, 12 (1963);
McMichael, Appraishfg Manual 573-75, 580 (4th ed. 1951).
223. Muhlker v. N.Y. & H.R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 572-73 (1905) (dissenting opinion). See
Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 227 N.E.2d 37, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1967), where the Court ap-
parently applied the first of these no-compensation theories to deny recovery. Cf. New York
State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 157, 176 N.E.2d 566,
569, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (1961).
224. Compensation based upon an amortized access value has been suggested. Note,
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 120 (1960). This answer, however, appears to be practically unworkable.
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pletely different from that of private neighbors seems obvious. The argument
was very early accepted by New York courts in change of grade cases.2 25 There
it was argued that, like the private owner who may grade his property almost as
he sees fit, even to the detriment of his neighbor, so may the state regrade a
street without consideration of the detrimental effect upon abutting owners. It
is often stated that the purpose of an eminent domain law is to accurately dis-
tribute the costs of public improvements among the public 22 6 The sovereign
acts not as the private neighbor, but as a trustee for the benefit of the public.
The analogous argument is made in a partial taking context that had the abutter
sold a strip of land to a private party he would have lost access across it. There-
fore, it is suggested, the same result should apply where the state is the "pur-
chaser." The argument is specious, in that it refuses to consider that the abutter
would have taken this loss of access into account in fixing the sale price, precisely
the computation the law of New York disallows in the "forced sale" to itself.
The final argument of increased cost to the state is the most difficult to rebut.
Yet it seems that the public should be expected to bear the costs of any improve-
ment it makes, through the sovereign, for its own benefit. The total cost includes
the amount in dollars of access lost by the abutter as well as all of the other costs
incurred in construction and maintenance. The addition of the value of loss of
access by abutters into the total cost picture would provide a more accurate
figure, and might impel planners to work in such a manner as to minimize these
damages. It is at least arguable that in some cases state planners have acted in
utter disregard of the damage they cause due to circuity of access alone.227
The foregoing theories in support of the "no compensation" rule in loss of
access cases simply do not afford a satisfactory "policy" reason for the rule. The
nineteenth century political consensus based upon the primacy of private prop-
erty interests has been supplanted by a new welfare state orientation which is
presently involved in what might be called civil libertarian growing pains at its
outer fringes. The areas of obvious conflict are the definition of one's personal
rights vis-h-vis the state, for example, the rights of the criminally accused. The
present abhorrence for the real or imagined inequities of what were deemed by
some to be the class conscious "good old days" of private property, though
perhaps justifiable, has affected us with a myopic inability to comprehend that
personal rights have and are being severely abused in the backyard of the dis-
carded consensus. This country and its state and municipal instrumentalities
simply would not under other circumstances tolerate the taking of a man's liveli-
hood under the guise of the police power. Yet this is exactly what has happened
225. Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor, 4 N.Y. 195 (1850); Waddell v. Mayor, 8 Barb. 95
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). See also Note, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 256, 258 (1947).
226. See, e.g., Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L.J.
221, 224 (1931) ; Note, 12 Albany L.J. 53 (1875).
227. See the fact pattern in Sukiennik v. State, 26 A.D.2d 169, 271 N.Y.S.2d 684 (4th
Dep't 1966).
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in some deprivation of access cases. The police power can be exercised to pau-
perize. We think that a change is warranted, and recognize that the possibility of
a change purely by judicial overruling of precedents is so remote as to be un-
worthy of consideration. The possibility of constitutional amendment must be
seriously considered.
